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Introduction
This dissertation deals with a topical issue in the fields of industrial organiza-
tion and growth theory: The relation between the intensity of competition and
process investments. We provide an analysis of this topic through four essays,
each with a theoretical and an experimental contribution.
The game-theoretic literature typically uses two-stage oligopoly games to in-
vestigate the eﬀect of more intense competition on investment incentives. This
eﬀect is generally regarded as ambiguous; depending on the definition of com-
petitive intensity and the particular oligopolistic environment, competition may
have diﬀerent eﬀects on investment.1 Further, the empirical analysis on the
subject is diﬃcult due to the lack of appropriate data, and the related literature
also comes to ambiguous conclusions.2 Therefore, we use laboratory experiments
as a complementary research strategy to investigate eﬀects that real-world data
would not be able to isolate.
The experimental analysis of Chapter 1 deals with a homogenous Bertrand
market where firms invest into cost reduction before product market competition.
This market is extremely competitive because only the firm with the lowest
marginal costs obtains a positive product-market profit. The second-stage profit
is thus a positive function of the own investment and a negative function of the
second-highest investment such that the profit is zero when the investments are
identical.
The theoretical part of Chapter 1 is not restricted to this particular game.
It is a general analysis of all-pay auctions with negative prize externalities. The
Bertrand investment game used in the experiment is a special case of the general
set-up. In contrast to all-pay auctions with fixed prizes, we consider two sources
1Schmutzler (2007) and Vives (2008, forthcoming) synthesize the existing literature. Boone
(2000) provides a unifying discussion of diﬀerent measures of competition.
2See, for instance, Gilbert (2006).
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of prize endogeneity. First, higher bids (investments) increase the value of the
prize (product-market profit); second, the bids of one player have adverse eﬀects
on the prize that another player obtains. We show that, for all-pay auctions
with bid-dependent prizes, (i) there are pure-strategy equilibria where exactly
one player bids a positive amount; (ii) there are symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
libria where players mix between all strategies up to a cut-oﬀ value. (iii) The
asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria identified for the fixed-prize case do not
exist;3 however, an alternative type of asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
exists.
The experiment is implemented as a reduced-form version of the Bertrand
game where players choose investments and obtain the equilibrium profits cor-
responding to the resulting product-market subgame.4 We consider two treat-
ments with two and four players.5 For both cases, we obtain overinvestment
both relative to the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium and the social opti-
mum. Subjects choose low investments less than predicted; high investments are
chosen more often than predicted, which results in negative profits. Interest-
ingly, the frequency distribution has a lot of mass around the cut-oﬀ value of the
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, which is also the non-zero investment in
the asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium.
Chapter 2 extends the analysis of Chapter 1 by capturing two notions of
more intense competition: Increasing the number of players and switching from
Bertrand to Cournot competition. We deal with four diﬀerent games where
two or four firms first choose cost-reducing investments and then compete in a
homogenous Cournot or Bertrand market.6 As predicted, and according with
the earlier literature of Isaac and Reynolds (1988, 1992), the experiment shows
that an increase in competition in the sense of a larger number of firms leads
to lower investments. Rather, switching from Cournot to Bertrand competition
yields higher investments, even though theory predicts a negative eﬀect in the
four-player case. For both Bertrand and Cournot competition, we obtain over-
3For asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in the fixed-prize case, see Baye et al. (1996).
4This avoid testing optimization in both stages and ensures that potential deviations from
the equilibrium investments do not result from anticipations of second-period deviations from
the product market equlilibrium. In Chapter 4, we will compare a reduced-form experiment
to a two-stage experiment, where subjects take first-stage and second-stage decisions.
5However, we do not compare the treatments to identify number eﬀects.
6The games are implemented as one-stage experiments, where players only take investment
decisions.
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investment. However, this overinvestment is more pronounced in the Bertrand
case. Thus, the experimental analysis suggests that behavioral eﬀects may im-
ply a more positive eﬀect of competition on investment than a purely theoretic
analysis would reveal.
Chapter 3 deals with an alternative but also very common measure of com-
petitive intensity. There, we identify an increase in competition with a reduc-
tion in product diﬀerentiation. We consider a game where duopolists choose
cost-reducing investments in the first stage. In the second stage, they engage
in diﬀerentiated Cournot competition. We show, that except for firms that are
much less eﬃcient than the competitor, there is a U-shaped relation between the
intensity of competition and investments. The experiment also provides support
for the U-shape, both for symmetric firms and for leaders (which have lower
marginal costs ex-ante). Also consistent with predictions, the relation is nega-
tive for firms that are lagging behind.7 However, there are deviations from the
equilibrium. In the symmetric case, there is overinvestment. In the asymmetric
case, leaders underinvest and laggards overinvest. Interestingly, these deviations
mostly reflect best responses to wrong beliefs that players have about the invest-
ments of the other subjects. Symmetric players and laggards believe that the
competitor invests less than he actually does; rather, leaders believe than the
competitor invests more than he actually does.
Finally, Chapter 4 deals with an important issue concerning the experimen-
tal design. The experiments discussed in the first three Chapters implement
two-stage models as reduced form versions of the original setting. This avoid
the chance of an influence of the second stage on the first one, ensuring that
equilibrium deviations in stage one do not result from the expectations that
subjects have about second-stage outcomes. To test whether the second stage
indeed influences first-stage behavior, we implement the game for symmetric
players discussed in Chapter 3 as a two-stage experiment, where subjects take
investment and quantity decisions. The two-stage experiment does not provide
support for the overinvestment obtained in the one-stage experiment. Rather,
there is underinvestment, showing that the product market stage has an impact
on first-stage investment behavior.
7Again, the game is implemented as a one-stage experiment.
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Chapter 1
All-Pay Auctions with Negative
Prize Externalities
Dario Sacco and Armin Schmutzler
1.1 Introduction
In all-pay auctions, all players cast bids for a prize which only one player obtains.
Contrary to ordinary auctions, even the losers have to pay their bids. All-pay
auctions have received a lot of attention, as they reflect important aspects of the
strategic interaction involved in many diﬀerent economic activities. For instance,
in innovation tournaments, firms’ investments influence the probability of win-
ning a patent, the value of which accrues to the winner. In lobbying contests,
rival activists can exert eﬀort to achieve the political outcome that is favor-
able for them. In promotion tournaments, the employees’ eﬀorts influence their
chances of promotion. Independently of the precise application, the literature
usually assumes that the strategic interaction relates exclusively to the chances
of obtaining the prize rather than to the ex-post value of the prize, which is
assumed to be exogenously fixed.
However, as Baye and Hoppe (2003) point out, there are many important
examples where players’ activities influence prizes. Specifically, they argue for
5
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investment tournaments that a high eﬀort not only increases the chances of ob-
taining the prize, but also its value. Even though the formulation of their model
is general enough to allow for the possibility, these authors do not mention an ad-
ditional source of prize endogeneity. The eﬀorts of one player may have adverse
eﬀects on the prize that another player obtains. For instance, consider a market
that is suﬃciently competitive that only a firm that is better than the others
can earn positive profits. For a particularly stark example, consider a homoge-
nous Bertrand market where firms can invest into cost reduction before product
market competition. Then, the firm with the lowest marginal costs obtains the
prize, that is, a positive product-market profit, but the size of the prize depends
on the investments of the competitors. If the second-best firm has invested al-
most as much as the winner, the requirement of limit pricing will lead to very
low profits for the winner.1 Thus, investments involve negative externalities not
only because they reduce their winning chances, but also because they reduce
the prize that the winner will obtain.
For a similar example, suppose the bids in the all-pay auction are specific
investments of job candidates (e.g., preparation for job interviews). Then, it is
natural to assume that the second-best player’s bid (eﬀort) influences the outside
options of the prospective employer. Therefore, the prize of the winner, that is,
the diﬀerence between his wage in the new position and his outside option is
likely to depend on the diﬀerence between his bid and the second-best bid. In
particular, this prize is likely to become small as the second-best bid approaches
the winning bid.
This paper therefore analyzes all-pay auctions where the prize (i) is a weakly
decreasing function of the second-highest bid such that (ii) the value of the prize
is zero when the bids are identical. Finally, we also assume that (iii) the prize is
a positive function of the own eﬀorts.
Our first set of contributions is theoretical. We characterize the equilibrium
structure of all-pay auctions with negative prize externalities. First, contrary to
standard fixed-prize auctions, all-pay auctions with bid-dependent prizes often
have pure-strategy equilibria (PSEs) where exactly one player bids a positive
amount. However, as there are as many of these (asymmetric) equilibria as there
are players, their predictive value is limited. Second, like in the standard case,
1In the homogeneous Bertrand case, the equilibrium profit margin of the most eﬃcient firm
corresponds to the diﬀerence between its costs and those of the second-best firm.
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there are typically symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria (MSEs) where players
put weight on all strategies up to a cut-oﬀ value. Third, the natural analogues
of the asymmetric MSEs identified by Baye et al. (1996) for the fixed-prize case
do not exist.2 However, there are asymmetric MSEs where some players mix
over all strategies up to a cut-oﬀ value and the others put all weight on zero.
The second contribution of the paper is an experimental analysis of a specific
all-pay auction with negative prize externalities. We consider parameterized
versions of the auction that is derived from the Bertrand investment game; with
2 and 4 players. In both games, players choose investments Yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9}. The
games have multiple PSEs where one player chooses a positive investment level
of 5 and the other player(s) choose 0. In both games, the symmetric MSE has
all players mixing between 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The experimental analysis shows
that the MSE predicts the percentage of zero investments quite well. However,
low, but positive investments are chosen less than predicted; high investments are
chosen more often than predicted, which results in negative profits. Interestingly,
the frequency distribution has a lot of mass around 5, the non-zero bid in the
asymmetric PSE.
As the standard MSE illustrated above is not a fully convincing predictor, we
also try to explain the investment behavior through modified objective functions,
capturing a “joy of winning” and a “fear of losing”. To this end, we extend the
profit function of the Bertrand investment game by two parameters: γ and β.
The former takes into account the additional benefit from investing more than the
others, the latter the additional loss from investing in vain. The MSE obtained in
this fashion reflects the investment behavior better, particularly in the 2-player
case, but the fit is still imperfect. Summing up, the best interpretation of the
evidence is that some players play the symmetric MSE, whereas others speculate
that the remaining bidders do not invest, and respond accordingly (like the active
bidder in the asymmetric PSE).
Auctions have been discussed extensively in the experimental literature.3 Ex-
periments on all-pay auctions are comparatively rare, and exclusively concerned
with the fixed-prize case. In spite of the diﬀerences in the equilibrium structure,
our experimental observations are similar to those that are familiar from the
2In those equilibria, some players behave as in the symmetric MSE; but other players modify
the strategy by not casting any positive, but small bids. Instead, they put all the weight that
these strategies receive in the symmetric MSE onto zero.
3See Kagel (1995) for a survey.
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fixed-prize case. Most closely related is Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) who
consider symmetric all-pay auctions with 4, 8, and 12 players. Like us, they ob-
tain overbidding that diminishes over time, but remains substantial even in later
periods. Also, as in our case, the percentage of very low bids is close to the MSE
prediction.4 Further, one of the six treatments analyzed by Davis and Reilly
(1998) corresponds to the fixed-prize all-pay auction.5 In an experiment with 5
players, the authors observe overbidding that diminishes over time, but does not
disappear. Davis and Reilly (1998) also consider the alternative probabilistic
set-up that goes back to Tullock (1980).6 This variant of the all-pay auction
has a symmetric PSE. Davis and Reilly (1998) show that overbidding also oc-
curs in the probabilistic case. Earlier experimental evidence on all-pay auctions
with fixed prizes is mixed. Millner and Pratt (1989) also observed overbidding,
whereas, in the simpler setting of Shogren and Baik (1991) the Nash prediction
is fairly accurate. Summing up, even though the equilibrium structure of the
all-pay auction with negative prize externalities diﬀers substantially from the
fixed-prize case, the experimental observations, in particular, the overbidding
phenomenon, are quite similar.
In this paper, we proceed as follows. Section 1.2 contains the general setting
with the characterization of the MSE. Section 1.3 introduces the experimental
design, including the analysis of the Bertrand investment game. Section 1.4
describes the experimental results, comparing the investment observations in
the Bertrand game to the MSE. Section 1.5 discusses alternative MSEs. Section
1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Assumptions
We analyze static games of the following type. Players i = 1, ..., I simultaneously
choose bids bi ∈ S = {0, 1, .., N} ⊂ N+. The cost of submitting bid bi = n is
4They also observe positive eﬀects of the number of bidders on revenue and negative eﬀects
on average bids, with the former arising only in first periods and the latter only in late periods.
5In contrast to Davis and Reilly (1998), the experiment of Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006)
takes the form of a repeated game, where subjects do not rotate among diﬀerent treatments,
playing the same all-pay auction.
6In this model, each player wins the prize with probability bi/
X
j
bj , where bi is his bid.
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kn such that k0 = 0 and kn is increasing in n. This includes the standard case
that kn = n, but allows for greater generality.7 Payoﬀs are given as follows. Let
g(ni, nj) be a function that is non-decreasing in ni, non-increasing in nj and
satisfies g(ni, nj) = 0 whenever ni ≤ nj. Let b(2) be the second-highest bid.
Then the payoﬀ of player i is given by
f
¡
bi, b(2)
¢
=
(
g(bi, b(2))− bi if bi > b(2)
−bi if bi ≤ b(2)
. (1.1)
Thus, as in a standard all-pay auction, only the highest bidder obtains a positive
payoﬀ. However, there is an important twist: The prize for a successful bidder
is not fixed. It depends on the winning bid, and on the second-highest bid. The
higher the winning bid, the higher the prize; the higher the second-highest bid,
the lower the prize. In the limit, as the diﬀerence between the highest and the
second-highest bid tends to zero, so does the prize. We further maintain the
following assumption.
Assumption 1 g(ni, nj) is concave in ni for ni > nj, and kn is convex in n.
Of course, the assumption is consistent with the special case that kn= n.
1.2.2 Asymmetric Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
In the following simple characterization of the asymmetric PSEs of the game, let
b∗ = argmaxbi (g(bi, 0)− bi).
Proposition 1 (i) If there exists a PSE of the game such that at least one player
i chooses bi > 0, then bi = b∗, all players j 6= i choose bj = 0, and there is one
such equilibrium for each player.
(ii) Such equilibria exist if and only if
max
bj
(g(bj, b∗)− bj) ≤ 0. (1.2)
The proof is straightforward: (i) If there is more than one player with non-
zero bids, at least one of them must earn negative payoﬀs. Also, the active
player must best-respond to zero. (ii) is a simple statement of the best-response
7For instance, we shall apply our framework below to the case that bi = n is a reduction of
marginal costs by n, and kn is the corresponding strictly convex investment cost.
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conditions for the candidate equilibria. Intuitively, condition (1.2) requires that
those players who choose bj = 0 do not find it profitable to leapfrog player i, that
is, to choose bj > b∗. Assumption 1 works in favor of this condition: Intuitively,
with concave prizes and convex costs, earning positive payoﬀs by overbidding
a player who has chosen the best response to 0 becomes increasingly diﬃcult.
However, in Section 1.3, we will provide an example where asymmetric PSEs
even exist in the boundary case that the prize is linear in the own bid.
In spite of its simplicity, the result is interesting, because it stands in stark
contrast with the case of fixed prizes. For deterministic all-pay auctions with
continuous strategy spaces, PSEs typically do not exist (Baye et al., 1996). This
result carries over to the case of discrete bids, as long as the prize is suﬃciently
large: With a fixed prize v, a PSE would still require that at most one player
chooses bi > 0. The best response condition of player i would require b∗ = 1
because this is suﬃcient to overbid the other players. However, b∗ = 1 would
make leapfrogging to b0j = 2 attractive for players with bj = 0, unless k2 > v.
More generally, even with bid-dependent prizes, a PSE does not exist if g(ni, nj)
increases more rapidly in ni than kni near ni = nj = n.
Essentially, with bid-dependent prizes, it often makes sense to overbid the
other players by a suﬃciently large amount. This may make it unattractive for
losing bidders to leapfrog the winner.
1.2.3 Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
Next, we provide a general characterization of symmetric MSEs. The result
implies that such equilibria exist under very general conditions, and it provides
an algorithm for calculating them. We use the following definitions.
Definition 1 For any mixed strategy p = (p0, ..., pn), p−(n) ≡ p−(n,I−1) is the
probability that the highest bid of I − 1 players following this strategy is n.
Next, we define a particularly important class of equilibrium candidates.
Definition 2 Suppose M ∈ {1, ..., N}. An M-equilibrium is a symmetric MSE
where all players put symmetric positive weights on strategies 0, ...,M, and zero
weights on all higher strategies.
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Proposition 2 provides a recursive formula for calculating symmetric MSEs for
all-pay auctions with bid-dependent prizes. In particular, it provides conditions
for the existence of such an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. (i) An M-equilibrium exists
if and only if there exists a sequence (q0, ..., qM−1) such that:
qn =
kn+1 − kn −
n−1X
m=0
qm (g(n+ 1,m)− g(n,m))
g(n+ 1, n)
, (1.3)
where
qn ≥ 0 for n ≤M − 1,
M−1X
n=0
qn < 1; (1.4)
and
M−1X
n=0
qng (M + 1, n) +
Ã
1−
M−1X
n=0
qn
!
g (M + 1,M)− kM+1 ≤ 0. (1.5)
For this equilibrium, p−(n) = qn for n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1}.
(ii) If an M-equilibrium exists, it is the unique symmetric MSE.
Proof. See Appendix.
We illustrate the meaning of the result, and its proof for M = 1. Then,
condition (1.5) becomes
q0g (2, 0) + (1− q0) g (2, 1)− k2 < 0. (1.6)
Condition (1.3) applied to n = 0 reads q0 = k1g(1,0) ; and, therefore, (1.4) merely
requires that g(1, 0)−k1 > 0. By Proposition 2, the game has a symmetric MSE
(p0, 1− p0, 0, ..., 0) where p−(0) = q0 = k1g(1,0) . This probability is such that players
are indiﬀerent between bidding 1 unit or not bidding. Also, (1.6) guarantees that
bidding 2 units would lead to negative expected payoﬀs. Using concavity of g
and convexity of the function kn, choosing bi > 2 is not profitable either. The
standard characterization result for MSEs (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, Proposition
8.D.1) therefore yields the result.
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1.2.4 Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
Baye et al. (1996) have shown that, for fixed prizes v and continuous bidding,
a symmetric equilibrium like the one just derived is not the only MSE of the
all-pay auction. In addition, there are asymmetric equilibria where some players
randomize over all strategies below a cut-oﬀ value, and all other players random-
ize in exactly the same fashion over all strategies starting from some lower bound
above zero up to the cut-oﬀ value, but put all the remaining mass on zero. In
the following, we show that natural analogues of such equilibria also exist in our
discrete game when the prize is fixed. In our more general setting, however, all
these equilibria disappear. Instead, there is another type of MSE where some of
the players put all mass on zero.
Fixed Prizes
In the degenerate case that the prize v is fixed, we show that there are also many
asymmetric MSEs similar to those identified by Baye et al. (1996). To formulate
this result, define Pn = p0 + ...+ pn.
Proposition 3 Suppose the prize is fixed, that is, g(ni, nj) = v for some suitable
constant v > 0 if and only ni > nj. Suppose there are I ≥ 3 players. Define
n = M to be the maximal bid such that v > kn. Suppose J ∈ {2, ..., I − 1},
r ≤M . Then there exist MSEs such that
(i) J players choose (p0, ..., pM , 0, ..., 0) ;
(ii) I − J players choose (Pr, 0, ..., 0, pr+1, ..., pM , 0, ..., 0) ;
(iii) Pn−1 =
¡
kn
v
¢1/(I−1)
for n ∈ {r, ...,M − 1};
(iv) Pn−1 =
µ
kn
v(krv )
(I−J)/(I−1)
¶1/(J−1)
for n ∈ {1, ..., r − 1};
(v) PM = 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
To illustrate the proposition, suppose I = 4, M = 3. Then, the proposition
says that there are four types of asymmetric equilibria, which diﬀer with respect
to the number of players who are not mixing over all strategies (1 or 2) and the
minimal non-zero strategy played by those players (2 or 3).8
8The condition that n =M be maximal with the property that v > kn is easily seen to be
necessary; for instance, when M = 2, there are no equilibria with some bidders randomizing
over 0, 1, and 2, and the remaining bidders randomizing over 0 and 2.
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Endogenous Prizes
The next result rules out the possibility that equilibria as derived in Proposi-
tion 3 exist when prizes are strictly decreasing in competitor bids. Thus, the
equilibrium properties of all-pay auctions with negative prize externalities are
dramatically diﬀerent from those of all-pay auctions with fixed prizes.
Proposition 4 Suppose g(ni, nj) is strictly decreasing in nj for ni > nj. Then,
there can be no equilibrium such that there exists an r ≥ 2 such that:
(i) At least one player chooses p with positive weights p0 and pr;
(ii) At least one player chooses ep with positive weights ep0 and epr such that ep0 >
p0, but ep1 = 0,..., epr−1 = 0;
(iii)
r−1X
n=0
pr =
r−1X
n=0
epr.
Proof. See Appendix.
This immediately rules out equilibria as in Proposition 3. The scope for
asymmetric equilibria is further limited by the following result.
Proposition 5 There can be no equilibrium such that there exists r ≥ 1, where
(p0, ..., pr) 6= (ep0, ..., epr) ; pn > 0 and epn > 0 for all n ∈ {0, ..., r}.
Proof. Suppose s ≤ r is minimal such that ps 6= eps. Then,
sX
n=0
p−(s)g (s, 0) 6=
sX
n=0
ep−(s)g (s, 0) , (1.7)
contradicting the requirement that both players are indiﬀerent between playing
s and 0.
Note that this result also holds in the case of fixed prizes.
However, there is one class of asymmetric MSE that does exist. In these equi-
libria, some players mix over all strategies up to some value M. The remaining
players all choose 0.
Proposition 6 Suppose I ≥ 3. Then, for every J ∈ {2, ..., I − 1}, there exist
equilibria such that:
(i) J players randomize over strategies 0, 1, ...,M, such that p−(n,J−1) = qn for
n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1}, where qn is defined as in (1.3) to (1.5);
(ii) The remaining players put all weight on 0.
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Proof. See Appendix.
In spite of the similarities in the strategies of the J active bidders with those
played in the symmetric MSE, there is a crucial diﬀerence: As there are some
players who put all weight on zero, qn (for n > 0) is the highest remaining bid.
The intuition for the result is that, if the J active bidders (who face J −1 active
bidders and I − J bidders who always bid 0) obtain zero expected profits for all
positive bids, the I −J passive bidders (who face J active bidders and I −J − 1
bidders who always bid 0) must obtain negative expected profits.
1.3 The Experiment
1.3.1 The Bertrand Investment Game
In the following, we will show that a simple two-stage game can be reduced to
an all-pay auction with negative prize externalities. In this Bertrand investment
game (BIG), all firms i = 1, ..., I are identical ex-ante with constant marginal
costs c > 0. In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose investments Yi ∈ [0, c),
resulting in marginal costs ci = c−Yi.9 Investment costs are kY 2i , where k > 0. In
the second stage, firms compete in the product market as Bertrand competitors;
with a demand function D(p) = a − p. Let cm−i = minj 6=i cj, and denote the
monopoly prices and payoﬀs (gross of investment costs) associated with marginal
costs ci as pM(ci) and πM(ci), respectively. It is well known that gross payoﬀs
of the most eﬃcient firm are
πi(c1, ..., cI , α) =
(
(cm−i − ci)D(cm−i), if cm−i ≤ pM(ci)
πM(ci), if cm−i ≥ pM(ci)
. (1.8)
Intuitively, if eﬃciency diﬀerences are suﬃciently small that the second-most
eﬃcient firm has costs below the monopoly price of the most eﬃcient firm, this
firm undercuts the competitors marginally, so that it obtains (approximately) a
demand ofD(cm−i) and a markup corresponding to the cost diﬀerential; otherwise,
it sets the monopoly price. We assume that the eﬃciency diﬀerences are so small
that no firm can earn the monopoly profit. Then, defining Y (2) = maxj 6=i Yj, the
9Even though we restrict the agents to finite choice sets in the experiment, the theoretical
analysis is much more transparent if the choice set is a continuum.
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net payoﬀ of firm i is given by
Πi(Y1, ..., YI) =
(
(Yi − Y (2))D(c− Y (2))− kY 2i , if Yi > Y (2)
−kY 2i , if Yi ≤ Y (2)
. (1.9)
Hence, with g(ni, nj) = (ni−nj)D(c−nj), the game corresponds exactly to our
general set-up. Even though this is a two-stage game, by assuming that players
play the Nash equilibrium in stage two, we can reduce the game to the first stage.
The one-stage game obtained in this fashion corresponds to an all-pay auction
with negative prize externalities.
It is straightforward to calculate the equilibria for the BIG. First, as already
suggested for the general case in Proposition 1, the game has multiple asymmetric
PSEs. Define α ≡ a− c.
Proposition 7 For k > 1
2
, there are multiple asymmetric PSEs with one firm
investing Yi = α2k and firms j 6= i investing Yj = 0.
Proof. If firms j 6= i invest Yj = 0, then the best response of firm i is Yi = α2k
for any k > 0. If firm i invests Yi = α2k , then the best response of the other firms
is Yj = 0 for k > 12 .
Intuitively, if more than one firm invests, then at least one firm obtains zero
product market payoﬀs and therefore negative net payoﬀs; deviation is therefore
profitable.
The BIG also has a symmetric MSE under very general conditions. We
calculate this equilibrium in the Appendix.
1.3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experimental design reflects the two-stage investment game which, as men-
tioned above, can be reduced to an all-pay auction with negative prize exter-
nalities, assigning the payoﬀs of the respective product market game to each
investment vector. Apart from making the game more transparent to the ex-
perimental subjects, this design feature highlights the nature of the game as
an all-pay auction, focusing attention on bidding (investment) rather than on
behavior in the product market. This guarantees that deviations do not result
from speculations about non-equilibrium behavior in the product market.10
10For instance, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) have shown that experimental subjects tend
to choose prices above marginal costs in symmetric Bertrand games. If subjects anticipate
this, the investment incentives will diﬀer from a situation with marginal-costs pricing.
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Our two sessions concern two examples of the BIG. We ran a two-player
(BIG2) and a four-player treatment (BIG4). The parameter values were α = 30
and k = 3 for BIG2; α = 20 and k = 2 for BIG4.11 We restricted investment
choice sets to Yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9} in both cases. Applying the results obtained
above, the following holds.
Observation 1 For BIG2 and BIG4, there are asymmetric PSEs, each with one
player investing 5 and the other player(s) investing 0.
Coordination on such equilibria is obviously problematic. The MSE is po-
tentially more appealing as a predictor.
Observation 2 (i) For BIG2, there is a symmetric MSE given by³
p
BIG2
0 , ..., p
BIG2
9
´
= (0.1, 0.193, 0.187, 0.182, 0.176, 0.160, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (1.10)
(ii) For BIG4, there is a symmetric MSE given by³
p
BIG4
0 , ..., p
BIG4
9
´
= (0.464, 0.198, 0.116, 0.086, 0.069, 0.067, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (1.11)
Hence, in both cases, players randomize over all strategies up to and including
5, the non-zero bid arising in the asymmetric PSE. (i) follows directly from
Corollary 1 in the Appendix, because pi = qi with two players. As to (ii),
Corollary 1 yields
(q0, ..., q9) = (0.1, 0.190, 0.182, 0.174, 0.167, 0.187, 0, 0, 0, 0) , (1.12)
from which we obtain
p
BIG4
0 = (q0)
1/3 = (0.1)1/3 = 0.464. (1.13)
The probability pBIG41 = 0.198 follows from
q1 = 3
³
p
BIG4
0
´2
p
BIG4
1 + 3
³
p
BIG4
1
´2
p
BIG4
0 +
³
p
BIG4
1
´3
= 0.190. (1.14)
Recursively, the other probabilities are obtained.
We note the following immediate implication of Observation 2.
11Because BIG2 and BIG4 also diﬀer with respect to α and k, the treatments cannot be
compared to identify number eﬀects (see Sacco and Schmutzler, 2008, for a discussion of
number eﬀects in investment games).
1. All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities 17
Observation 3 (i) For BIG2, the expected investment is 2.62. (ii) For BIG4,
the expected investment is 1.30.
The experiments were conducted in February and June 2006 at the Uni-
versity of Zurich. The participants were undergraduate students from various
disciplines. Each treatment was run for 20 periods. There were 34 subjects in
BIG2 and 36 in BIG4. This led to a total of 1400 investment observations. No
subject participated in both sessions. The participants were randomly matched
into groups of size 2 or 4 after each period (Stranger design).12 At the end
of each period, subjects were informed about the investment level of the other
group member(s) and their own net payoﬀ for that period. All participants re-
ceived an initial endowment of CHF 35 (≈EUR 22) under BIG2 and CHF 45
(≈EUR 28) under BIG4. Average earnings including the endowment were CHF
32 (≈EUR 20) for BIG2 and CHF 38 (≈EUR 24) for BIG4. Sessions lasted
about 90 minutes each. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
1.4 Experimental Results
1.4.1 The 2-Player Case
Our first observations concern the relation between the symmetric MSE and
realized mean investments.
Result 1 Under BIG2, mean investments are higher than in the symmetric
MSE.
Figure 1.1 reveals that the mean investment level exceeds the equilibrium
investment level of 2.62 throughout the 20 periods. A regression over a constant
and a Wilcoxon rank sum test show high significance (p < 0.01) when consider-
ing the diﬀerence between predicted and observed investments over all periods.
This still holds when taking into account either the last ten or the last five peri-
ods. That is, there is no convergence to the Nash equilibrium, even though the
investments in the first ten periods are significantly higher than those in the last
12The subjects thus take their decisions based on one-shot considerations.
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Figure 1.1: Mean investment for BIG2.
ten periods (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = 0.016).13
A further interesting aspect concerns the investment distribution. The prop-
erties of this distribution over all periods are summarized in Result 2.
Result 2 Under BIG2, (i) the frequency distribution exhibits a global maximum
at 5. (ii) There is a local maximum at 0. (iii) A substantial fraction of the
subjects chooses strategies that are not part of the symmetric MSE, that is, invests
more than 5.
Figure 1.2 shows that (i) the investment level of 5 is played in 24% of the
cases. (ii) The investment level of 0 is chosen in 15% of the cases. (iii) In 28%
of the cases a strategy that is not part of the symmetric MSE is played. We
see that the observed investment levels are higher than predicted. Except for
the investment level of 0, low investments are chosen less than predicted; high
investments more often than predicted.
Qualitatively, the properties summarized in Result 2 also hold in most indi-
vidual periods, not just in the aggregate.14
13Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) report qualitatively similar results for the symmetric
all-pay auction. As described in the introduction, however, there are important diﬀerences
between the structure of the Bertrand investment game and the all-pay auction.
14(i) In 19 periods the investment distribution exhibits a global maximum at 4 or 5. (ii) In
15 periods there is a local maximum at 0. (iii) The fraction of subjects investing more than 5
lies between 15% and 35% per period.
1. All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities 19
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Investment
Pe
rc
en
t
BIG2 MSE
Figure 1.2: Investment distribution for BIG2.
Interestingly, the heterogeneity of investments represents diﬀerences in indi-
vidual investment propensities as much as heterogeneity in investments across
time. Table 1.1 shows that the distribution of the mean investments per sub-
ject displays similar heterogeneity as the overall distribution of investments.15
However, the two frequency distributions have qualitatively diﬀerent features.
Specifically, the former has a single global maximum in [4, 5), whereas the latter
has a local maximum in 0 apart from the global maximum in 5.
Interval [0, 1) [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 4) [4, 5) [5, 6) [6, 7) [7, 9]
Frequency 1 1 6 6 11 6 2 1
Table 1.1: Subject distribution for BIG2.
To show how player heterogeneity translates into net payoﬀ diﬀerences, we
first consider the relation between mean investments and mean losses. Figure
1.3 reveals that there is a clear positive relation.16 This is closely related to the
evolution of the mean net payoﬀ over time. Figure 1.4 shows that the mean
net payoﬀ is negative in all periods, even towards the end of the game. Over
all periods and subjects, the ratio between total bids (investment costs) and the
prize (gross payoﬀs) is 1.56. The ratio in the first ten periods is higher than
15Decomposing the variance into the variance of the average investments of players and the
variances of individual players’ investments shows that 39% come from the former source.
16The regression analysis shows an R2 of 0.77.
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in the last ten periods (1.85 > 1.35). While still substantial, these values are
considerably lower than those reported by Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) for
the case of fixed prizes. There, depending on the treatment, total bids where
still 2-3 times higher than the prize in the last period.
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Figure 1.3: The relation between mean investments and losses for BIG2.
1.4.2 The 4-Player Case
The analysis of the 4-player case leads to similar results as in the 2-player case,
confirming the overinvestment behavior. We start with the comparison of pre-
dicted and observed mean investments.
Result 3 Under BIG4, mean investments are higher than in the symmetric
MSE.
Figure 1.5 reveals that the mean investment level lies above the equilibrium
investment level of 1.30 throughout the 20 periods. Note, however, that there is
a downward tendency. The investments in the first ten periods are significantly
higher than those in the last ten periods (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = 0.018).
Even in the final periods, investments stay above the equilibrium investment,
though there is no significant diﬀerence for the last 5 periods (Wilcoxon rank
sum test, p = 0.116).
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Figure 1.4: Mean net payoﬀ for BIG2.
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Figure 1.5: Mean investment for BIG4.
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Next, we deal with player heterogeneity. The properties of the investment
distribution over all periods are summarized in Result 4.
Result 4 Under BIG4, (i) the frequency distribution exhibits a global maximum
at 0. (ii) There is a local maximum at 6. (iii) A substantial fraction of the
subjects chooses strategies that are not part of the symmetric MSE, that is, invests
more than 5.
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Figure 1.6: Investment distribution for BIG4.
Figure 1.6 shows that (i) the investment level of 0 is played in 42% of the
cases. (ii) The investment level of 6 is chosen in 11% of the cases. (iii) In 22%
of the cases a strategy that is not part of the symmetric MSE is played. Again,
there is overinvestment. Nevertheless, one aspect of the MSE is well reflected in
behavior, namely the fact that the investment level of 0 is chosen in almost half
of the cases.
The general patterns shown in Result 4 also hold in most individual periods.17
Table 1.2 shows that, as in BIG2, the distribution of investments reflects
player heterogeneity to a large extent. However, contrary to BIG2, the majority
of players now chooses very low average investments, with the mode in [0, 1).
17Specifically, (i) in all periods except the first one, the largest fraction of subjects chooses
zero. (ii) In 14 periods, there is a local maximum at 5 or 6. (iii) The fraction of subjects
investing more than 5 lies between 12% and 32% per period.
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10 of the 36 players invest at most one unit on average. Similarly, 10 of the 36
players invest between 4 and 6 units on average.18
Interval [0, 1) [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 4) [4, 5) [5, 6) [6, 7) [7, 9]
Frequency 10 6 6 3 4 6 1 0
Table 1.2: Subject distribution for BIG4.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of overinvestment on net payoﬀs. Figure 1.7
plots mean investments against mean losses. A clear positive relation emerges
(R2 = 0.87). The mean net payoﬀs over the 20 periods are shown in Figure 1.8.
The mean net payoﬀ is negative in all periods, implying that the overinvestment
is not profitable. Over all periods and subjects, the ratio between bids and prizes
is 1.92. Again, the ratio in the first ten periods is higher than in the last ten
periods (2.12 > 1.75).
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Figure 1.7: The relation between mean investments and losses for BIG4.
Both for BIG2 and BIG4, we have seen that, apart from zero investments,
the symmetric MSE discussed above is not a perfect predictor for the observed
investment behavior. BIG4 also has asymmetric MSEs (see Proposition 6) where
some players put all weight on zero. This does not improve the fit, as this would
18The variance’s decomposition shows that 48.5% comes from the mean investments.
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Figure 1.8: Mean net payoﬀ for BIG4.
lead to more weight on 0, rather than on 5. For instance, if J = 2, the expected
frequencies are given by³
pˆ
BIG4
0 , ..., pˆ
BIG4
9
´
= (0.55, 0.095, 0.091, 0.087, 0.083, 0.094, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (1.15)
The next section discusses MSEs based on alternative objective functions
which shall help us to understand the investment behavior better.
1.5 Alternative Objective Functions
For the Bertrand game, we now consider the following modified objective func-
tion. The net payoﬀ of firm i given in (1.9) is replaced by
Π˜i(Y1, ..., YI) =
(
(Yi − Y (2))D(c− Y (2))− kY 2i + γ, if Yi > Y (2)
−kY 2i − β, if Yi ≤ Y (2) ∧ Yi 6= 0
,
(1.16)
where γ > 0 and β > 0.
(1.16) captures the idea that one may derive utility from winning the auction
(captured by the parameter γ), and disutility from bidding a positive amount
in vain (captured by the parameter β). As we intend to explain overinvestment,
we consider parameterizations where γ > β. Subjects might overinvest because
they focus on winning on the investment race, neglecting investment costs. In
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the following, we illustrate the symmetric MSEs of this modified game for two
parameterizations. We start with γ = 100, β = 20. For BIG2, the investments
are shown in Figure 1.9.
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Figure 1.9: Investment distribution for BIG2 (γ = 100, β = 20) .
We see that the predicted zero investments essentially coincide with the ob-
served ones. Further, in contrast to the symmetric MSE of the previous section,
the frequency distribution corresponding to the symmetric MSE of the modified
game also has two maxima. In spite of this great advantage, the fit is far from
perfect: The symmetric MSE has too much mass on very high investments, and
it fails to predict the observed global maximum at 5.
The investments for γ = 50 and β = 20 are shown in Figure 1.10. The
lower value of the γ-parameter implies that the equilibrium does not overpredict
high values as much as in the case reflected in Figure 1.9. The symmetric MSE is
shifted to the left. The global maximum at 0 is more pronounced (23% instead of
15%), whereas the local maximum is at 6. However, this improvement comes at
a cost: The percentage of subjects choosing zero is now predicted less accurately.
This trade-oﬀ also shows up in other parameterizations. It thus appears that,
in spite of the additional degrees of freedom, the modified equilibrium does not
capture behavior in a fully satisfactory manner.
In the modified approach just described, subjects obtain some utility from
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Figure 1.10: Investment distribution for BIG2 (γ = 50, β = 20) .
investing more than the others even if the net payoﬀ is negative.19 As an alter-
native, we assume that the additional benefit γ arises only if the net payoﬀ is
positive. For the additional loss, the same as above holds. Figure 1.11 shows for
γ = 100 and β = 20 the frequency distribution in the BIG2. In contrast to Fig-
ure 1.9, except for zero investments, the symmetric MSE is more concentrated
on the left; the global maximum is at 3. A decrease to γ = 50 would shift the
global maximum from 3 to 0.20
Next, consider the 4-player case. In contrast to the 2-player case, the dif-
ference between the symmetric MSE with modified payoﬀs as in (1.16) and the
standard symmetric MSE is very small. Figure 1.12 shows the investments for
γ = 5 and β = 1. In the symmetric MSE, players mix between all investment
choices up to 6 instead of 5. Apart from that, there are no consistent diﬀerences:
Low investments are chosen less than predicted, high investments more often
than predicted. Further, a parameter change does not have a large impact. For
γ = 2.5 and β = 1, the symmetric MSE-distribution is very similar to that of
19If the monetary losses from investing more than the others are suﬃciently high relative to
γ, the net payoﬀ according to (1.16) may be negative.
20As a further alternative, we briefly mention the case where the additional benefit γ is given
if the net payoﬀ is positive and the additional loss β if the net payoﬀ is negative. The results
are qualitatively similar to those illustrated in Figure 1.11. However, a decrease in γ would
not shift the global maximum, which is at 3 for both considered parameterizations.
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Figure 1.11: Investment distribution for BIG2 (γ = 100, β = 20) .
Figure 1.12.21
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Figure 1.12: Investment distribution for BIG4 (γ = 5, β = 1) .
Summing up, the observed deviations from the symmetric MSE cannot be
explained perfectly by a “joy of winning” or “a fear of losing”, as proposed
21Like for the two-player setting, we also considered the case where the additional benefit γ
arises only if the net payoﬀ is positive and another case, where γ is given if the net payoﬀ is
positive and β if the net payoﬀ is negative. The MSE does not show remarkable diﬀerences
with respect to Figure 1.12; we therefore omit additional considerations.
1. All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities 28
here. One reason may be that the approach does not allow for the asymmetries
between players suggested by the experimental observations. It might therefore
be useful to consider an alternative approach where the γ and β-parameters
are allowed to vary across players, and calculate the Bayesian equilibrium for
alternative parameterizations.22 An alternative, more casual explanation that is
also based on player heterogeneity could start from the observation that, at least
in BIG2, there is a large concentration of players at 5, which is the best response
to 0. This suggests that some players speculate that the opponent abstains from
investing, and responds optimally to their own belief.
1.6 Conclusion
We have analyzed all-pay auctions, where the prize is a positive function of the
own bid and a negative function of the other players’ bids; it is zero when players’
bids are identical. That is, the eﬀort of one player has negative externalities on
the prize that another player obtains. This negative eﬀect of the own eﬀort on
the prize that another bidder gets diﬀerentiates our setting from standard all-pay
auctions.
We showed that, contrary to the fixed-prize case, the game often has asym-
metric PSEs. Like the fixed-prize auction, it has a symmetric MSE. The asym-
metric MSEs that loom large in the fixed-prize case analyzed by Baye et al.
(1996) do not exist, however.23 We then provided an experimental analysis that
is motivated by a particular example that corresponds to a reduced version of a
Bertrand investment game. It turned out that, the symmetric MSE of this game
predicts the percentage of zero bids very well. However, like in the fixed-prize
case analyzed in earlier experiments (e.g., Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006), there
is overinvestment, but it is less pronounced.
As the symmetric MSE resulting from the Bertrand investment game does not
predict the investment behavior well, we considered alternative payoﬀ functions.
We extended the analysis to account for “joy of winning” and “fear of losing”.
For the 2-player setting, the symmetric MSEs obtained in this fashion reflect
the investment behavior better, but not perfectly. For the 4-player setting, the
22Standard fixed-prize all-pay auctions have been analyzed as Bayesian games by Amann
and Leininger (1996).
23However, there are alternative asymmetric MSE where some players mix over strategies
up to a cut-oﬀ value and others always play zero.
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symmetric MSEs based on the modified net payoﬀ functions do not lead to
substantial improvements.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) First, consider suﬃciency. By (1.4),Ã
q0, ..., qM−1, 1−
M−1X
n=0
qn, 0, ..., 0
!
(1.17)
defines a probability distribution. Together with the requirement that qn = p(n),
(1.3) for n = 0 guarantees that players are indiﬀerent between strategies 0 and 1.
A simple induction argument yields indiﬀerence between all strategies 0, 1, ...,M :
Suppose indiﬀerence obtains for some n = m, that is,
m−1X
n=0
qng(m,n)− km = 0. (1.18)
Then,
mX
n=0
qng(m+ 1, n)− km+1 =
m−1X
n=0
qng(m,n)− km+
m−1X
n=0
qn (g(m+ 1, n)− g(m,n)) + qmg(m+ 1, n)− (km+1 − km) = 0, (1.19)
where the last equation follows from (1.3) and (1.18). The left hand side of (1.5)
is the expected payoﬀ that a player would obtain by choosingM +1 units, when
the other players play the proposed equilibrium (p0, ..., pM−1, 1− pM−1, 0, ..., 0)
such that p−(n) = qn. Concavity of g(ni, nj) and convexity of the function kn
imply that choosing arbitrary n > M would lead to negative expected payoﬀs.
By the standard characterization result for the MSE (Mas-Colell et al. 1995,
Proposition 8.D.1), an MSE obtains. Necessity is immediate in view of this
characterization result.
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(ii) We show that (a) there exists no MSE without weight on zero, and (b)
no equilibrium with p0 > 0, pr > 0 for some r > 0, and ps = 0 for some
s ∈ {1, ..., r − 1}; (c) At most one M-equilibrium can exist.
(a) Let n > 0 be minimal in p such that qn > 0. Then the net payoﬀ from
choosing n when all other players choose p is −kn < 0.
(b) Let s be minimal such that ps = 0. Hence,
s−1X
n=0
qng(s− 1, n)− ks−1 ≥ 0 ≥
sX
n=0
qng(s, n)− ks =
s−1X
n=0
qng(s, n)− ks. (1.20)
Therefore,
s−1X
n=0
qn(g(s, n)− g(s− 1, n))− (ks − ks−1) ≤ 0. (1.21)
By concavity of g and convexity of kn, we have
s−1X
n=0
qn(g(s+ 1, n)− g(s, n))− (ks+1 − ks) ≤ 0. (1.22)
Using (1.20) and (1.22),
s−1X
n=0
qng(s+ 1, n)− ks+1 ≤ 0. (1.23)
Next, suppose
ps = 0, ..., ps+l−1 = 0,where l = 2, ..., N − s. (1.24)
Then,
s−1X
n=0
qng(s+ l, n)− ks+l =
s−1X
n=0
qng(s+ l − 1, n)− ks+l−1+
s−1X
n=0
qn(g(s+ l, n)− g(s+ l − 1, n))− (ks+l − ks+l−1) ≤ 0. (1.25)
(1.25) is non-positive by (1.24) and (1.22). Thus, ps+l = 0.
(c) Suppose an M-equilibrium exists. Hence,
M−1X
n=0
qng(M,n)− kM = 0. (1.26)
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An L-equilibrium (L < M) would require
L−1X
n=0
qng(M,n) + (1−
L−1X
n=0
qn)g(M,L)− kM ≤ 0. (1.27)
But,
(1−
L−1X
n=0
qn)g(M,L) >
M−1X
n=L
qng(M,L) >
M−1X
n=L
qng(M,n). (1.28)
Proof of Proposition 3
The J players who mix between all strategies between 0 and M must be
indiﬀerent between all these strategies. To see this, note that (iii) and (iv) imply
(Pn−1)
I−1 v − kn = 0 for n ∈ {r, ...,M} ; (1.29)
(Pr)
I−J (Pn−1)
J−1 v − kn = 0 for n ∈ {1, ..., r − 1} . (1.30)
As the left-hand sides of (1.29) and (1.30) are the expected payoﬀs of the
corresponding strategies, the required indiﬀerence conditions hold. For n > M ,
expected payoﬀs are negative because v > kM .
The I−J remaining players must be indiﬀerent between strategies 0 and r, ...,M .
As strategies n ∈ {r, ...,M} yield expected payoﬀs (Pn−1)I−1 v − kn = 0, the in-
diﬀerence condition holds. For strategies n ∈ {1, ..., r − 1}, these players face a
lower chance of having submitted the highest bid than those players that ran-
domize over all strategies. Hence, using (1.30), their expected payoﬀ is negative.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let p−(n)(ep−(n)) denote the probability that the highest bid of the opponents
of a player who chooses p (ep) is n. We shall show that, violating the requirement
that both types of players obtain expected payoﬀs equal to kr when they choose
bi = r, the following condition holds:
ep−(0)g(r, 0)+ ...+ ep−(r−1)g(r, r−1) < p−(0)g(r, 0)+ ...+p−(r−1)g(r, r−1). (1.31)
To see this, first note that (iii) implies
p−(0) =
Ã
r−1X
n=0
p−(n) −
r−1X
n=1
p−(n)
!
; (1.32)
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ep−(0) = Ãr−1X
n=0
p−(n) −
r−1X
n=1
ep−(n)! . (1.33)
Thus,
r−1X
n=0
¡
p−(n) − ep−(n)¢ g(r, n) =
¡
p−(0) − ep−(0)¢ g(r, 0) + r−1X
n=1
¡
p−(n) − ep−(n)¢ g(r, n) =
Ã
r−1X
n=1
ep−(n) − r−1X
n=1
p−(n)
!
g(r, 0) +
r−1X
n=1
¡
p−(n) − ep−(n)¢ g(r, n) =
r−1X
n=1
¡
p−(n) − ep−(n)¢ (g(r, n)− g(r, 0)) > 0, (1.34)
where the last expression holds because g(ni, nj) is strictly decreasing in nj and
(i) and (ii) imply p−(n) < ep−(n) for all n ∈ {1, ..., r − 1}.
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Following the argument in the proof of Proposition 2, the conditions in
(i) for the J active bidders show that these players obtain zero expected profits
on strategies 0, 1, ...,M.
(ii) Let pˆ−(n) denote the probability that the highest of the remaining bids
for I − J passive bidders is n. Because, compared with an active bidder, each
passive bidder faces one more active bidder and one less passive bidder, pˆ−(n)
stochastically dominates p−(n), that is, there exists an r ∈ {1, ...,M} such that:
pˆ−(n) < p−(n) for n ∈ {0, ..., r − 1}; (1.35)
pˆ−(n) > p−(n) for n ∈ {r, ...,M}; (1.36)
By (1.35),
s−1X
n=0
pˆ−(n)g(s, n) <
s−1X
n=0
p−(n)g(s, n) ∀s ∈ {0, ..., r}. (1.37)
By (1.35) and (1.36),
s−1X
n=0
pˆ−(n)g(s, n)−
r−1X
n=0
p−(n)g(r, n) =
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r−1X
n=0
¡
pˆ−(n) − p−(n)
¢
g(s, n)−
s−1X
n=r
¡
p−(n) − pˆ−(n)
¢
g(s, n) <
g(s, r − 1)
r−1X
n=0
¡
pˆ−(n) − p−(n)
¢
− g(s, r)
s−1X
n=r
¡
p−(n) − pˆ−(n)
¢
< 0. (1.38)
(1.38) holds because
g(s, r − 1) > g(s, r) (1.39)
and
r−1X
n=0
¡
pˆ−(n) − p−(n)
¢
>
s−1X
n=r
¡
p−(n) − pˆ−(n)
¢
. (1.40)
The Bertrand Investment Game
Proposition 2 immediately allows us to characterize the symmetric MSE as
follows.
Corollary 1 A symmetric MSE of the BIG exists if and only if, for some M ∈
{1, ..., N}, there exists a sequence (q0, ..., qM−1) satisfying
qn =
kn+1 − kn −
M−1X
n=0
qm (α+m)
(α+ n)
, (1.41)
where
qn ≥ 0 for n ≤M − 1,
M−1X
n=0
qn < 1; (1.42)
and
M−1X
n=0
qn (M − n) (α+ n) +
Ã
1−
M−1X
n=0
qn
!
(α+M − 1)− kM < 0. (1.43)
The equilibrium is given as (p0, ..., pM−1, 1− pM−1, 0, ..., 0) such that for n =
0, ...,M − 1 qn is the probability that, given (p0, ..., pn), the highest of I − 1 bids
is n.
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Chapter 2
Competition and Innovation: An
Experimental Investigation
Dario Sacco and Armin Schmutzler
2.1 Introduction
Simple two-stage games are often used to derive predictions about the eﬀects of
the intensity of competition on cost-reducing investments.1 The empirical test of
these predictions is very diﬃcult, and the literature comes to ambiguous conclu-
sions.2 Therefore, this paper uses laboratory experiments as a complementary
research strategy to explore whether at least the basic strategic eﬀects identified
in the theoretical models are present in a laboratory setting.
Specifically, we consider four diﬀerent games where two or four firms can
choose a cost-reducing investment before they engage in Cournot or Bertrand
competition. In this fashion, we can explore the eﬀects of increasing competition
both by increasing the number of players and by switching from Cournot to
Bertrand competition. Thus, we can capture two of the most familiar notions
of increasing competition. The predicted eﬀect of competition on investment is
unambiguously negative for an increase in the number of firms. For a shift from
1Schmutzler (2007) and Vives (2008, forthcoming) synthesize the existing literature.
2See Gilbert (2006).
36
2. Competition and Innovation: An Experimental Investigation 37
Cournot to Bertrand competition, the eﬀect is mostly negative, except in the
duopoly case for some parameter constellations, including one of the treatments
we considered.
The experiments fully confirm the negative number eﬀects.3 For a switch
from Cournot to Bertrand competition, however, the observed eﬀect is always
positive, even when the predicted eﬀect is negative. This observation relates to
how players deviate from the Nash equilibrium. In both cases, there is over-
investment. However, this overinvestment is more pronounced in the Bertrand
case, so that there may be a positive eﬀect of switching from Cournot to Bertrand
even when theory predicts a negative eﬀect.
Obviously, a simple set of experiments cannot resolve the century-old debate
about the eﬀects of competition on investment. First of all, there are too many
conceptual ambiguities at the theoretical levels. Even the definition of increasing
intensity of competition is contentious, some insightful attempts to structure
the debate notwithstanding.4 Second, even if one settles for a specific notion
of increasing competition in two-stage games, there is a bewildering variety of
models to investigate the issue.5 Third, of course, one can go beyond the two-
sage setting and investigate more complicated dynamic models.6 Finally, one
may worry about the external validity of the laboratory setting as a means
of testing predictions about the long-term strategic decisions of managers in
(potentially large) firms.
In spite of all these cautionary remarks, we believe that the subsequent analy-
sis leads to one important insight: Our laboratory analysis suggests that behav-
ioral eﬀects may imply a more positive eﬀect of competition on investment than
3Importantly, note that our analysis is distinct from the more familiar analysis of number
eﬀects in oligopolies (Huck et al., 2004; Orzen, 2008, forthcoming). This literature deals with
the eﬀects on prices and quantities rather than on investments.
4Boone (2000) shows that many diﬀerent measures of competition share the common prop-
erty that increasing competition can be associated with a higher ratio of the profits between
more eﬃcient and less eﬃcient firms.
5Vives (2008, forthcoming) provides a unifying discussion of two-stage games, with the
extent of product diﬀerentation as an inverse measure of competition. Schmutzler (2007)
extends the discussion to other measures of competition.
6For instance, Lee and Wilde (1980) identify a positive eﬀect of the number of firms on in-
vestment per firm in a Bertrand setting, whereas Delbono and Denicolò (1991) find a negative
eﬀect, even on total investment, in the Cournot case. In a stochastic patent race preced-
ing product market competition, Delbono and Denicolò (1990) show that investment in the
Bertrand case is unambiguously higher than in the Cournot case. Bester and Petrakis (1993)
show that, with suﬃciently large horizontal product diﬀerentiation, the innovation incentive
is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition.
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a purely theoretic analysis would reveal. Future work will have to show how
robust these eﬀects are in the lab. More importantly, perhaps, it will have to
show whether the eﬀect is also present in the field.
There are only few experimental studies which directly deal with the linkage
between intensity of competition and R&D investments. Isaac and Reynolds
(1988, 1992) consider the number eﬀects. They deal with stochastic static and
dynamic patent races and show that an increase in the group size lowers invest-
ment per firm and raises aggregate investment. We are not aware of experimental
papers comparing Cournot to Bertrand competition. In Sacco and Schmutzler
(2008), we analyze a two-stage Bertrand game, where investments precede price
competition.7 We show that overinvestment is substantial. However, there, we
do not deal with the eﬀects of increasing competition.8
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 contains the theoretical frame-
work. Section 2.3 describes the experimental design and results. Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 The Model
We analyze static two-stage games, where firms i = 1, ..., I first invest in R&D
and then compete in the product market. The demand function for the ho-
mogenous product is given by D(p) = a − p, with a > 0. All firms i are
identical ex-ante with constant marginal costs c > 0. In the first stage, firms
simultaneously choose R&D investments Yi ∈ [0, c), resulting in marginal costs
ci = c−Yi.9 The cost of R&D is given by kY 2i , where k > 0. In the second stage,
firms simultaneously choose quantities (Cournot) or prices (Bertrand). We refer
to the Cournot case as soft competition (SC); to the Bertrand case as intense
competition (IC).
7Suetens (2005) considers investment games in a Cournot setting. However, she is not
concerned with the eﬀects of competition.
8The theoretical part of the paper deals more generally with all-pay auctions with negative
prize externalities. The Bertrand investment game used in the experiment is a special case of
the general set-up.
9Even though agents are restricted to finite strategy sets in the experiment, the theoretical
analysis is much more transparent if the strategy set is a continuum.
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2.2.1 Soft Competition
For SC, backward induction shows that the net payoﬀ function of firm i in the
first stage is given by
Πi(Y1, ..., YI , α, k) =
µα+ IYi −Pi6=j Yj
I + 1
¶2
− kY 2i , (2.1)
where α ≡ a− c represents the demand parameter.10
The gross payoﬀ of firm i, that is, the first term on the right-hand side of
(2.1), depends positively on its own investment and the demand parameter, and
negatively on the investments of the other firms. Competition is soft in the sense
that even a firm that invests less than the others achieves a positive gross payoﬀ,
unless Yi ¿ Yj.
Maximizing (2.1) with respect to Yi yields
∂Πi(·)
∂Yi
=
2I(α+ IYi −
P
i6=j Yj)
(I + 1)2
− 2kYi ≡ 0. (2.2)
We assume that the second order condition holds, that is,
∂2Πi(·)
∂Y 2i
=
I2
(I + 1)2
− k < 0, (2.3)
which is fulfilled for arbitrary I ≥ 2 if k > 1.
The equilibrium follows immediately from (2.2).
Proposition 8 Under SC, the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium invest-
ment levels are
Y SC =
αI
k(I + 1)2 − I . (2.4)
By (2.4), equilibrium investments are increasing in the demand parameter α,
and decreasing in the cost parameter k and in the number of firms I.
2.2.2 Intense Competition
For IC, backward induction shows that the net payoﬀ function of firm i in the
first stage is given by
Πi(·) =
(
(Yi − Y m−i)D(c− Y m−i)− kY 2i , if Yi > Y m−i
−kY 2i , if Yi ≤ Y m−i
, (2.5)
10Here and in the following, we assume that α+ IYi −
P
i6=j Yj ≥ 0.
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where Y m−i = maxj 6=i Yj. Competition is intense in the sense that a firm can
achieve a positive gross payoﬀ only by investing more than the highest investment
of the others. If Yi > Y m−i , maximizing (2.5) with respect to Yi gives
∂Πi(·)
∂Yi
= D(c− Y mj )− 2kYi ≡ 0. (2.6)
Yi ≤ Y m−i can only be a best response if Yi = 0 holds: If firm i does not invest
more than all others, it gets a negative net payoﬀ. In such a case the deviation
to Yi = 0 is profitable. The pure-strategy equilibrium is thus characterized as
follows.
Proposition 9 (i) Under IC, for k > 1
2
, there are multiple asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibria with one firm investing Y ICi =
α
2k and firms j 6= i investing
Y ICj = 0. (ii) There are no other pure-strategy equilibria.
Proof. (i) If firms j 6= i invest Y ICj = 0, then according to (2.6) the best
response of firm i is Y ICi =
α
2k for any k > 0. If firm i invests Y
IC
i =
α
2k , then the
best response of the other firms is Y ICj = 0 for k >
1
2
. That is, firm j does not
have an incentive to exceed the investment of firm i by choosing Y ICj =
α
2k +∆,
where ∆ > 0. The value ∆ = α
4k2 maximizes Πj(·) which is negative for k > 12 .
(ii) is immediate.
Thus, the average equilibrium investment level is given by
Y
IC
=
α
2kI
, (2.7)
which is increasing in the demand parameter, and decreasing in the cost
parameter k and in the number of firms I.
It is unlikely that agents can coordinate on one of the asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibria, in particular, because only the investor obtains positive pay-
oﬀs. In the experimental analysis, we therefore refer to the following result of
Sacco and Schmutzler (2008).
Proposition 10 The IC-game has a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, where
firms mix between all strategies up to a cut-oﬀ level.
In the companion paper, we also provide an algorithm for calculating this
equilibrium.11
11The game also has asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria where some firms always play
zero and others randomize.
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2.2.3 The Eﬀects of Increasing Competition
We now show that, with a small qualification for the comparison between SC
and IC, the predicted eﬀects of competition on investment are negative.
Corollary 2 For a given type of product market competition, SC or IC, the
average equilibrium investments are decreasing in I.
Similarly, comparing (2.4) to (2.7), the following result arises.
Corollary 3 Suppose that (2.3) holds and k > 1
2
. The average equilibrium
investment for SC is higher than the average investment in each asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium for IC unless I = 2 and k > 2.
Though we cannot provide such a result for the mixed-strategy equilibrium
at this level of generality, a similar statement holds for the parameters we choose
(see 2.3.1).
Thus, except for the caveat for I = 2, for both concepts of competitiveness,
an increase in competition reduces investment.
2.3 The Experiment
2.3.1 Choosing the Parameters
We conducted four treatments. There were two sessions with two-player groups
(SC2 and IC2) and four-player groups (SC4 and IC4), respectively.12 Further,
we chose α = 30 and k = 3. In the experiments, we restricted the strategy
sets to Yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9}. It can be shown that the equilibria of the game with
the discrete strategy set are (2, 2) for SC2 and (2, 2, 2, 2) for SC4. However, this
prediction relies on an extremely mechanical application of the Nash equilibrium.
It is straightforward to show that marginal investment incentives are higher for
each player in SC2 than in SC4. Economic intuition therefore suggests that the
eﬀect of increasing the number of players should be negative.13 This prediction
is obtained if one views the players as playing a continuous game: In the Nash
12The results for IC2 are also reported in Sacco and Schmutzler (2008).
13Schmutzler (2007) formalizes this intuition. He gives general conditions under which an
increase in the number of players (weakly) reduces the investments of players in an investment
game. These conditions hold in the example.
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equilibrium of the continuous version of SC2, investments are higher than for
SC4 (2.4 > 1.69).
Under IC, according to Proposition 9, there are asymmetric equilibria, each
with one firm investing 5 and the other firm(s) 0. This holds both for the dis-
crete and continuous strategy set. Moreover, according to Sacco and Schmutzler
(2008), IC2 has a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (MSE) given by
(p0, ..., p9) = (0.1, 0.193, 0.187, 0.182, 0.176, 0.160, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (2.8)
For IC4, the symmetric MSE is given by
(p0, ..., p9) = (0.464, 0.2, 0.119, 0.088, 0.071, 0.057, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (2.9)
The expected investment level is 2.62 for IC2 and 1.27 for IC4.14
2.3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted in June and November 2006 at the
University of Zurich. The participants were undergraduate students.15 To focus
on investment choices, we reduced the games to the first stage, that is, to the
investment stage. For each investment profile, players earned the unique Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs of the corresponding subgame. Thus, we did not model
the product market stage explicitly.16 This allows us to avoid confusion about
the source of possible deviations from the equilibrium in the investment game:
Contrary to a two-stage experiment, investment decisions cannot be influenced
by speculations about deviations from equilibria in the product-market stage.17
We implemented two sessions with IC treatments, and two with SC treat-
ments. In each session there were 20 periods and in two of four sessions 36
subjects.18 This led to a total of 2760 investment observations. No subject par-
ticipated in more than one session. The participants were randomly matched
14Note that the expected investment levels are close to the average investments (Y
IC2
= 2.5;
Y
IC4
= 1.25).
15We did not exclude any disciplines. We had students of law, engineering, psychology,
economics etc.
16A similar strategy was pursued in the Cournot investment experiments of Halbheer et
al. (2007). Sacco (2008) compares the behavior of subjects in a two-stage experiment with
behavior in the corresponding reduced-form game.
17Such deviations are known to arise both in the Bertrand case (Dufwenberg and Gneezy,
2000) and in the the Cournot case (Huck et al., 2004, and many others).
18In the SC4 and IC2 sessions there were 32 and 34 participants, respectively.
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into groups of size two or four after each period. This corresponds to a Stranger
design.19 At the end of each period, subjects were informed about the investment
level of the other group member(s) and their own net payoﬀ for that period. In
each session, participants received an initial endowment of CHF 35 (≈EUR 22).
Average earnings including the endowment were CHF 31 (≈EUR 19) for IC2
and CHF 32.50 (≈EUR 20) for IC4. The amounts for SC2 and SC4 were CHF
49 (≈EUR 31) and CHF 39 (≈EUR 24), respectively. Sessions lasted about
90 minutes each. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
2.3.3 Results
Based on the results contained in 2.2.3 and 2.3.1, we test the following hypothe-
ses.
Hypothesis 1 Investments are lower in SC4 than in SC2.
Hypothesis 2 Investments are lower in IC4 than in IC2.
Hypothesis 3 (a) Investments are lower in IC4 than in SC4. (b) Investments
are higher in IC2 than in SC2.
That is, we first consider the eﬀects of increasing the number of players. The
analysis of the SC treatment (Hypothesis 1) precedes that of the IC treatment
(Hypothesis 2). Second, for a given number of players, we consider the eﬀects of
switching from SC to IC (Hypothesis 3).
Soft Competition
The mean investments over all periods and subjects are 2.59 and 1.83 for SC2 and
SC4, respectively. These are slightly above, but very close to the equilibria of the
continuous version of the SC game. Hence, in spite of the discrete formulation of
the game, the continuous game may provide better predictions than the discrete
game, which, to repeat, predicts average investments of 2 in both cases. This
point is interesting beyond the specific game.
19Observe that through the choice of a Stranger design the experimental analysis is based
on one-shot considerations.
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Result 5 Mean investments are higher for SC2 than for SC4.
Considering all periods, both a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon
rank sum test show that the diﬀerence between the two treatments is highly
significant (p < 0.01). This also holds in the last five periods. That is, the mean
investment level under SC2 does not converge to that under SC4.
0
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Figure 2.1: Mean investments under SC.
Figure 2.1 reveals that there is overinvestment for SC2 and underinvestment
for SC4 if one takes the equilibrium of the discrete game as the benchmark.20
Relative to the equilibrium of the continuous game, there is overinvestment in
both cases. Over all periods, the diﬀerence between observed investments and
corresponding continuous benchmark is highly significant. However, in the last
five periods, the diﬀerence is significant only for SC4 (p = 0.017).
While the main objective of this subsection was the test of Hypothesis 1, we
also note in passing that investments are concentrated around the equilibrium
(see Figure 2.2).
Result 6 For SC2, 77% of the investments over all periods are either 2 or 3.
For SC4, 80% of the investments are either 1 or 2.
20In SC2, the diﬀerence between investments and Nash equilibrium is highly significant over
all periods. This also holds in the last five periods. In SC4, the diﬀerence with respect to
the prediction is likewise highly significant throughout the 20 periods. Interestingly, this also
holds in the last five but not in the first five periods.
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Figure 2.2: Investment distributions under SC.
Also, the concentration around the equilibrium arises in almost every single
period.21
Finally, the concentration of investments around the equilibrium is also re-
flected in the average investments of each player.
Interval [0, 1) [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 4) [4, 5) [5, 6) [6, 7) [7, 8) [8, 9]
SC2 0 1 28 6 1 0 0 0 0
SC4 2 20 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2.1: Subject distributions under SC.
For each interval of length 1, Table 2.1 gives the number of subjects whose
average investment is in the interval. For SC2, 28 of the 36 subjects choose mean
investments over the 20 periods between 2 and 3. For SC4, 20 of the 32 subjects
have mean investments between 1 and 2.
The observed deviations from the Nash equilibrium are strikingly diﬀerent
from those in standard Cournot oligopoly games where players choose outputs
rather than investments. These games are structurally very similar to the re-
duced version of the investment game, in that they also feature strategic substi-
21Under SC2, the investment level of 2 is chosen most often in 17 periods, followed by 3.
In the remaining three periods, 3 is the most frequently played investment level, followed by
2. Under SC4, again in 17 periods, 2 is chosen most often, followed by 1. In the other three
periods, 1 is played most often, followed by 2.
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tutes and negative externalities. Hence, in the Nash equilibrium, players choose
more output than under joint-profit maximization. In experiments with few
players, subjects collude, that is, choose output levels below the Nash equilib-
rium and closer to joint-profit maximization. For more players, this result is
reversed; output is even higher than predicted in the Nash equilibrium (Huck et
al., 2004). Thus, more intense competition leads to less cooperative behavior.
For our investment games, this is no longer true, no matter whether one uses
the discrete or the continuous game as a benchmark. Relative to the former
benchmark, the Huck et al. (2004) results are reversed: Players choose too high
levels of the non-cooperative action for SC2, but too low levels for SC4. Relative
to the latter benchmark, actions are too high for both SC2 and SC4.
Intense Competition
Next, we consider Hypothesis 2, which is based on the result that the expected
investment level in the MSE for IC2 (2.62) is higher than for IC4 (1.27). The
experiment provides evidence for this prediction.
Result 7 Mean investments are higher for IC2 than for IC4.
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Figure 2.3: Mean investments under IC.
Figure 2.3 reveals that the mean investment level under IC2 does not ap-
proach the one under IC4. The diﬀerence between the two treatments is highly
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significant over all periods, and even in the last ten or the last five periods.22
Figure 2.3 also shows that, both under IC2 and IC4, the mean investments
over the 20 periods always lie above the MSE values of 2.62 and 1.27, respectively.
In IC2, the diﬀerence between investments and the MSE is highly significant
throughout the 20 periods. This still holds in the last ten or the last five periods.
That is, there is no convergence to the Nash equilibrium value of 2.62, even
though the investments in the first ten periods are significantly higher than
those in the last ten periods (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = 0.016).
In IC4, considering all periods, a regression over a constant shows that the
diﬀerence between investments and the MSE is highly significant, whereas a
Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates high significance only in the first five pe-
riods (p = 0.01).23 However, the investments in the first ten periods are not
significantly higher than those in the last ten periods (Wilcoxon rank sum test,
p = 0.146). Again, there is no convergence to the MSE value of 1.27. In the last
five periods, a Wilcoxon rank sum test shows significance at the 4%-level.
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Figure 2.4: Deviation from the equilibrium under IC.
Inspection of Figure 2.4 shows that, in IC2 and IC4, the percentage deviations
from the theoretical predictions are similar in most periods. Over all periods,
the diﬀerence between the two treatments is not significant.
22This holds both for a Wilcoxon rank sum test and for a regression over a constant.
23The heterogeneity of investment choices under IC4 explains this discrepance.
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Having provided support for the comparative statics result (Hypothesis 2), we
now investigate to which extent the asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria and the
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium predict behavior within each IC treat-
ment. In both treatments, the investments that are part of the asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibria stand out. Even though, unsurprisingly, the players do
not coordinate perfectly on such an equilibrium, the two equilibrium strategies
are played particularly often.
Result 8 For IC2, the frequency distribution exhibits a global maximum at 5.
There is a local maximum at 0. For IC4, the frequency distribution exhibits a
global maximum at 0. There is a local maximum at 5.
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Figure 2.5: Investment distribution under IC2.
Figure 2.5 shows that, in IC2, the investment level of 5 is played in 24% and
that of 0 in 15% of the cases. Figure 2.6 shows that, in IC4, the corresponding
percentages are 17% and 43%. These qualitative properties show up clearly in
almost every individual period.24
The next results concerns the relation to the MSE.
24For IC2, in 19 periods, the investment distribution exhibits a global maximum at 4 or
5. In 15 periods, there is a local maximum at 0. For IC4, in each period, the investment
distribution exhibits a global maximum at 0 and a local maximum at 4 or 5.
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Figure 2.6: Investment distribution under IC4.
Result 9 For IC2 and IC4, the MSE predicts the percentage of zero invest-
ments very well, but underpredicts the percentage of subjects who choose high
investments.
In both cases, low non-zero investments are chosen much less than predicted,
and high investments more often. Figure 2.6 reveals that the MSE predicts the
percentage of zero investments very well. However, also for IC4, overinvestment
is substantial. The investment levels of 0, 1, and 2 are chosen less often than
predicted; those from 3 to 9 more often than predicted.
Interval [0, 1) [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 4) [4, 5) [5, 6) [6, 7) [7, 8) [8, 9]
IC2 1 1 6 6 11 6 2 1 0
IC4 8 9 7 4 7 1 0 0 0
Table 2.2: Subject distributions under IC.
Table 2.2 shows that the heterogeneity of investments reflects heterogeneity
across players. For IC2, except that there is no local maximum in [0, 1), the
distribution of the average investments is similar to the distribution of Figure
2.5. For IC4, except for the fact that the global maximum arises in [1, 2) instead
of [0, 1), the distribution is similar to that of Figure 2.6.
To sum up, the number eﬀects predicted by Hypothesis 2 are reflected quite
well in the data. The point predictions of both types of equilibria are imper-
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fect. Roughly speaking, the observed behavior corresponds to a mix between the
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium and the asymmetric pure-strategy equi-
librium.
Soft versus Intense Competition
We now turn to Hypothesis 3. We shall show that investments are higher in
both IC treatments than in the corresponding SC treatments, even though the
MSE predicts this only for SC2, in which case the equilibrium investments both
for the discrete (2) and continuous benchmark (2.4) are lower than for the MSE
under IC2 (2.62). The experiment provides evidence for this prediction.
Result 10 As predicted, mean investments are higher for IC2 than for SC2.
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Figure 2.7: Mean investments for IC2 and SC2.
Over all periods, the diﬀerence between mean investments in IC2 and SC2
is highly significant. Figure 2.7 shows that the mean investment level under
IC2 does not approach the one under SC2. Even in the last five periods, the
diﬀerence remains highly significant.
While the comparative statics observation is consistent with equilibrium be-
havior, Figure 2.7 reveals that the higher investment in IC2 is reinforced by
behavioral eﬀects. In each period, overinvestment, measured as the percent-
age by which mean investments exceed the corresponding equilibrium value, is
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greater in IC2 than in SC2. The diﬀerence is highly significant when taking into
account either all periods or the last five periods (see Figure 2.8).
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Figure 2.8: Deviation from the equilibrium for IC2 and SC2.
Interestingly, in the four-player case, the behavioral eﬀects are so strong
that they overturn the comparative statics prediction of Hypothesis 3, which
was based on the observation that the equilibrium investments both for the
continuous (1.69) and discrete benchmark (2) in SC4 are higher than for the
MSE in IC4 (1.27).
Result 11 Contrary to the prediction, mean investments are higher for IC4 than
for SC4.
Figure 2.9 shows that, except for period 18 and 19, the mean investment
level is higher in IC4 than in SC4. Taking into account all periods, a regression
over a constant shows that the diﬀerence between the two treatments is highly
significant. However, a Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates significance at the 10%-
level only in the first ten periods. Mean investments under IC4 seem to converge
to those under SC4. However, a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank
sum test lead to diﬀerent results. Considering the last five periods, the former
shows no significant diﬀerence between the two treatments, whereas the latter
exhibits significance at the 4%-level.25
25Again, due to the heterogeneity of the investment choices, which is generally more pro-
nounced for IC than for SC, the statistical analysis is not unique.
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Figure 2.9: Mean investments for IC4 and SC4.
To sum up, investments are higher for IC than for SC, even in the four-
player case where this does not correspond to the Nash prediction. Essentially,
this results because the tendency to overinvest is more pronounced for IC than
for SC.
The Eﬃciency of Investments
It is intuitively clear that the tendency to invest more than in the Nash equi-
librium cannot be beneficial for firms. In this section, we measure the eﬃciency
relative to joint profit maximization (JPM). Of course, this eﬃciency notion only
considers the firms’ interest. If consumers’ interests were taken into account, the
overinvestment would have to be interpreted as an eﬃciency-increasing deviation
from the Nash equilibrium.
For IC, the maximal joint net payoﬀ is achieved in each asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium;26 for SC, the joint profit maximization benchmark implies
lower investments than the Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, investments impose a
negative externality on the other players.27 In all treatments, players overinvest
26As this equilibrium strategy has one player investing and considering that this player
maximizes his own net payoﬀ by choosing the investment level of 5, it follows that also the
joint net payoﬀ is maximal.
27For SC2, it can be shown that the maximal joint net payoﬀ arises when the two players
choose the investment level of 1; under SC4, when one player chooses 1 and the others 0.
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relative to the JPM. To measure the extent of deviation from JPM, consider the
eﬃciency rate (ER), defined as
ER =
Mean Joint Net Payoﬀ
Maximal Joint Net Payoﬀ
.
The ER considers the joint net payoﬀ over all periods and groups in relation
to the maximal joint net payoﬀ. For IC, negative values emerge, which reflect
the ineﬃciency resulting from overbidding. Under IC2, a value of −0.69 arises;
under IC4, −0.87. The participants made losses over the 20 periods. In IC2, 22
of the 34 subjects earned a negative net payoﬀ in at least 14 periods. In IC4, 13
of the 36 subjects earned a negative net payoﬀ in at least 13 periods. No subject
earned more than the initial endowment at the end of the IC sessions. On the
other hand, the SC cases are relatively eﬃcient. The SC2 treatment leads to an
ER of 0.91. For SC4, the value is 0.77. Each participant earned more than the
initial endowment.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the eﬀects of more intense competition on investments
in an experiment where a reduced form version of a simple two-stage R&Dmodel
has been implemented. In the first stage, firms whose marginal costs are identical
ex-ante simultaneously invest in R&D. The investment leads to a decrease in
marginal costs. In the second stage of the game, firms simultaneously choose
quantities or prices in a homogenous good market.
When more intense competition is modeled as an increase of the number of
firms for a given type of product market competition, the theoretical prediction
is that, both for SC and IC, an increase in the number of agents yields lower
mean investments. This hypothesis is confirmed in the lab. When more intense
competition is modeled as a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition, the
observed investments increase, even though the MSE only predicts this in the
two-player case.
An important limitation of our analysis concerns the very long run. As
overinvestment tends to coincide with negative earnings in the IC game, it is not
sustainable. Thus, in the very long run, firms must either adapt their behavior
or they will disappear from the market. This feature is much less pronounced in
the SC game, where overinvestment is compatible with positive earnings. One
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might therefore conjecture that, in the long run, whereas overinvestment remains
in the SC case, it disappears in the IC case.
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Chapter 3
Competition and Investment: A
U-shaped Relation
Dario Sacco
3.1 Introduction
A large game-theoretic literature deals with strategic investment decisions in an
oligopolistic environment. One important class of papers focuses on the relation
between the intensity of competition and process investment, typically using
two-stage oligopoly games. This relation is generally regarded as ambiguous;
depending on the precise definition of competitive intensity and the particular
oligopolistic environment, competition may have positive or negative eﬀects on
investment (Gilbert, 2006; Schmutzler, 2007; Vives, 2008, forthcoming). In a
general equilibrium setting, it has been argued that an inverse U-shaped relation
is also conceivable (Aghion et al., 2005). This paper provides the surprising result
that in a simple partial equilibrium framework a direct (non-inverted) U-relation
between competition and investment can emerge, and it provides experimental
support for the claim.
We consider a simple standard model: In the first stage of the game, duopolists
choose cost-reducing investments; in the second stage, they engage in diﬀerenti-
56
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ated Cournot competition with linear inverse demand functions pi = a−qi−bqj,
where b ∈ [0, 1]. An increase in competition corresponds to a reduction in prod-
uct diﬀerentiation (higher value of b). Thus, in the polar case where b = 0 there
are essentially two monopolies; b = 1 corresponds to a homogeneous Cournot
market. For symmetric firms, that is, identical initial marginal costs, an increase
in competition reduces investments as long as product diﬀerentiation remains
suﬃciently strong; as products become suﬃciently similar, however, a further
increase in competition raises investments. This U-shape becomes even more
pronounced for firms that are initially ahead of the competitors. However, if a
firm lags substantially behind the competitor, increasing intensity of competition
has an unambiguously negative eﬀect on investments.
Thus, our model makes two main points. First, there is a U-shaped relation
between intensity of competition and investment for a wide range of parameters;
second, competition is more likely to have a negative eﬀect on investments for
strong laggards. As both points are made in a standard, but nevertheless rather
specific model, it is important to understand the intuition. To this end, it is
crucial to analyze the eﬀects of the intensity of competition on marginal invest-
ment incentives, that is, the absolute value of the derivative of equilibrium profits
(gross of investment costs) with respect to own marginal costs.1 This marginal
investment incentive itself depends in a non-monotone way on the competition
parameter, reflecting the interaction of two countervailing eﬀects. First, in the
diﬀerentiated Cournot model, as in most reasonable cases, competition has a neg-
ative eﬀect on the absolute mark-up that a firm can command in equilibrium.
Hence, the positive eﬀect on equilibrium demand that comes from a cost-reducing
investment is less valuable. This points to a negative eﬀect of competition on
marginal investment incentives. However, as competition increases, the positive
demand eﬀect of increasing eﬃciency becomes more pronounced, suggesting a
positive relation between competition and marginal investment incentives. The
U-shape thus comes from the interaction of these two eﬀects.
The diﬀerence between leaders and laggards can be explained similarly. Es-
sentially, while both eﬀects are still present for strong laggards, the positive eﬀect
becomes small for a firm that has a low demand because it is less eﬃcient than
the competitor.
1When investment incentives are increasing, investments in the subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium of the game are also increasing under fairly weak additional conditions (see Schmutzler,
2007).
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The paper also provides experimental evidence that supports the main re-
sults. In view of the simple structure of the model, we implement the experiment
as a one-stage game where players choose investments, and then obtain the equi-
librium profits corresponding to the resulting product market subgame.2 We
carried out a large number of experiments to identify the U-shaped relation be-
tween intensity of competition and investment and its robustness. We considered
both symmetric and asymmetric settings. In both cases, we compared the invest-
ments for weak competition (b = 1/10) to intermediate competition (b = 2/3)
and strong competition (b = 1). In the symmetric case, investments are lowest
for intermediate competition, as predicted. However, there is overinvestment for
all values of b. In the asymmetric case, the U-shaped relation arises for leaders,
but the positive eﬀect of moving from intermediate to strong competition is not
as intense as predicted. For laggards, the predicted negative eﬀect of competi-
tion on investment holds, but it is also less pronounced. Interestingly, to a large
extent, these deviations reflect best responses to wrong beliefs that players have
about the investments of the other subjects. That is, symmetric players and
laggards believe that the competitor invests less than he actually does; rather,
leaders believe than the competitor invests more than he actually does.
Though the focus is on the eﬀects of competition on investment, our analysis
also provides some insights into a related debate. A large literature has dealt
with the issue of self-reinforcing market dominance. When firms diﬀer in their
initial eﬃciency levels, is there a tendency for these diﬀerences to become larger
over time? The theoretical literature has identified forces that go in both direc-
tions (see Athey and Schmutzler, 2001). Though our model is only static, one
of the key mechanisms for weak increasing dominance is present: Firms that are
initially more eﬃcient than others invest more. The asymmetric treatments of
our experiments allow us to test whether increasing dominance actually arises.
Indeed, this question is answered in the aﬃrmative, essentially independent of
the degree of competition. However, because leaders underinvest and laggards
overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium, the diﬀerence between the invest-
ments of leaders and laggards is obviously smaller than predicted by the model.
While the theoretical analysis of oligopolistic investment models is well es-
tablished, the experimental analysis is still in its infancy. Except for two early
2For the case of symmetric duopolists engaging in diﬀerentiated Cournot competition, Sacco
(2008) compares a two-stage experiment, where subjects take investment and quantity deci-
sions, to the corresponding reduced-form game.
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contributions of Isaac and Reynolds (1988, 1992) which deal with patent races
and show that an increase in competition in the sense of a larger number of
firms has a negative eﬀect on investments, most of the literature has only de-
veloped recently. Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) consider homogenous Cournot
and Bertrand settings with two and four firms.3 Consistent with the earlier lit-
erature, they show that a larger number of firms lowers investments, whereas
increasing competition in the sense of moving from Cournot to Bertrand has a
positive eﬀect on investments.
The first experimental paper that analyzes whether weak increasing dom-
inance emerges is Halbheer et al. (2007). These authors also identify weak
increasing dominance in a simple static Cournot model. They treat the homoge-
nous case allowing for parameterizations reflecting spillovers between firms.
In this paper, we proceed as follows. Section 3.2 contains the theoretical
framework. Section 3.3 discusses the experimental design and results. Section
3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Diﬀerentiated Cournot-Duopoly
Consider firms i = 1, 2 producing heterogenous goods. Suppose without loss of
generality that c1 ≤ c2. If the inequality strictly holds, then firm 1 plays the
leader’s role; firm 2 is the laggard. Otherwise, firms are symmetric. The inverse
demand functions are given by
pi = a− qi − bqj, i 6= j, (3.1)
where b ∈ [0, 1] , and a > 0.
For b = 0, equation (3.1) implies that both firms are monopolists. The other
polar case b = 1 corresponds to a homogenous Cournot market. Thus, the higher
b the higher the intensity of competition.
From profit maximization, the equilibrium quantity of firm i is given by
qi =
2Yi − bYj
4− b2 , (3.2)
3Suetens (2005) deals with a Cournot-Duopoly. However, she is not concerned with the
eﬀects of increasing competition.
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where Yi ≡ a− ci > 0 represents the eﬃciency level.4
(3.2) implies the following equilibrium profits:
Πi =
µ
2Yi − bYj
4− b2
¶2
. (3.3)
The cost reduction incentives are given by
∂Πi
∂ci
= −8Yi − 4bYj
(4− b2)2
= − 4qi
4− b2 < 0. (3.4)
Given qi > 0 and b ∈ [0, 1] , we have ∂Πi∂ci < 0, which means that a cost
reduction increases firms’ profits.
The eﬀect of the intensity of competition on marginal incentives to invest is
captured by
∂2Πi
∂ci∂b
=
(16 + 12b2)Yj − 32bYi
(4− b2)3
. (3.5)
Investigation of (3.5) yields Proposition 11.
Proposition 11 Suppose 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 and 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < a. Then, the following
holds: (i) For the leader, there is a U-shaped relation between the intensity of
competition and marginal incentives to invest, with the minimum at 0 < b ≤ 2
3
.
(ii) For the laggard, there is a U-shaped relation with the minimum at 2
3
≤
b ≤ 1 if Y1Y2 ≤
8
7
. (iii) If Y1Y2 >
8
7
, the marginal incentives for the laggard are
strictly decreasing. (iv) For symmetric firms, there is a U-shaped relation with
the minimum at b = 2
3
.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is straightforward to see from Proposition 11 that, for the laggard, the
U-shaped relation is only given when c1 and c2 are suﬃciently close.
3.2.2 The Investment Game
Consider now a two-stage game, where firms i = 1, 2 first engage in cost-reducing
investments and then compete in the product market. The inverse demand func-
tions are given by (3.1). Initial marginal costs are denoted as c0i and correspond-
ing eﬃciency levels as Y 0i ≡ a−c0i > 0. In the following, we assume c01 ≤ c02; thus,
Y 01 ≥ Y 02 . In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose investments yi ∈ [0, c0i ),
4For the leader and symmetric firms, (3.2) is always positive; for the laggard, if b < 2Y2Y1 .
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resulting in marginal costs ci = c0i − yi. The eﬃciency level of firm i after the
investment stage is given by Yi = Y 0i + yi. The investment costs are quadratic
and given by ky2i , where k > 0. In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose
quantities, that is, they compete à la Cournot.
According to (3.3), the net profit of firm i = 1, 2 in the first stage of the game
is given by
πi =
µ
2(Y 0i + yi)− b(Y 0j + yj)
4− b2
¶2
− ky2i , i 6= j. (3.6)
The maximization of (3.6) with respect to yi leads to
∂πi
∂yi
=
8 (Y 0i + yi)− 4b
¡
Y 0j + yj
¢
(4− b2)2
− 2kyi ≡ 0. (3.7)
The second-order condition is given by
∂2πi
∂y2i
=
8
(4− b2)2
− 2k < 0. (3.8)
Note that (3.8) is fulfilled ∀b ∈ [0, 1] if k > 4
9
.
From (3.7), it follows that
yi =
4Y 0i − 2b
¡
Y 0j + yj
¢
k (4− b2)2 − 4
. (3.9)
Relation (3.9) implies the following equilibrium investments:
y∗i =
(4 + 4b2k − 16k)Y 0i + (8bk − 2b3k)Y 0j
8k(4− b2)− k2 (4− b2)3 − 4
. (3.10)
Note that (3.10) is positive if Y 0i and Y 0j are suﬃciently close.5
The diﬀerence between leader’s and laggard’s equilibrium investments is given
by
y∗1 − y∗2 =
2(c01 − c02)
k(b− 2)(4− b2) + 2 . (3.11)
Note that (3.11) is positive ∀c01 < c02, ∀b ∈ [0, 1] , and ∀k > 0.6 That is, the
firm that is initially more eﬃcient invests more than the other firm, implying
that increasing dominance arises.
5For instance, consider b = 1 and k = 1. Then, (3.10) is positive if Y
0
i
Y 0j
> 34 .
6For c01 = c
0
2, (3.11) is obviously zero.
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3.2.3 Choosing the Parameters
In this section, we consider a specific parameterization that we also use in the
experiment. We first treat the asymmetric case. Let a = 50, k = 1, c01 = 21,
c02 = 25. For these parameters,
Y 01
Y 02
=
a− c01
a− c02
=
29
25
>
8
7
. (3.12)
For the leader, there is a U-shaped relation between intensity of competition
and incentives to invest by Proposition 11. For the laggard, (3.12) implies strictly
decreasing investments.7 Figure 3.1 shows the plots of the leader’s and laggard’s
equilibrium investments for b ∈ [0, 1] .
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Figure 3.1: Leader’s and laggard’s investments.
In the experiment, we consider three cases for b, which correspond to diﬀerent
intensities of competition: b = 1/10 (weak), b = 2/3 (intermediate), and b = 1
(strong). For the leader, the equilibrium investments are as follows:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b = 1/10⇒ y∗1 = 9.18
b = 2/3⇒ y∗1 = 8.68
b = 1⇒ y∗1 = 11.70
. (3.13)
7Actually, to ensure that laggard’s investments are strictly decreasing, ex-ante marginal
costs may be less close than stated in Proposition 11. This can be shown through the derivative
of (3.10) for i = 2 with respect to b; (3.12) becomes Y
0
1
Y 02
≥ 124121 .
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For the laggard, we have:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b = 1/10⇒ y∗2 = 7.75
b = 2/3⇒ y∗2 = 5.75
b = 1⇒ y∗2 = 3.70
. (3.14)
Consider now the symmetric case. Figure 3.2 shows the plot of the equilib-
rium investments for a = 50, k = 1, c01 = c02 = 21, and b ∈ [0, 1] .
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Figure 3.2: Investments of the symmetric firms.
For the three values of the competition parameter b, the following equilibrium
investments y∗1 = y∗2 = y∗ arise:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b = 1/10⇒ y∗ = 9.09
b = 2/3⇒ y∗ = 7.75
b = 1⇒ y∗ = 8.28
. (3.15)
For both firms, there is a U-shaped relation between intensity of competition
and investments.8
8By Proposition 11, the minimum of the investment function lies at b = 2/3.
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3.3 The Experiment
3.3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
The game implemented in the experiment is a reduced form version of the de-
scribed two-stage game. To focus on investment choices which we restricted to
yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 14}, we reduced the game to the first stage, that is, to the invest-
ment stage. We did not model the product market stage explicitly. Instead,
for each investment profile, players earned the unique Nash equilibrium profits
of the corresponding subgame. This was a deliberate modeling choice ensuring
that, whatever deviations from the equilibrium investments might arise, they
do not result from anticipations of second-period deviations from the product
market equilibrium.
In October and November 2007, we conducted eight experimental sessions
at the University of Zurich. The participants were undergraduate students from
various disciplines. In the first four sessions, we implemented the symmetric
case; in the last four, the asymmetric case with the leader-laggard structure.
Each session had 20 periods. In each session, there was a switch of the com-
petition parameter after period 10. That is, participants played the game for
one parameterization in the first ten periods and for the other parameterization
in the second ten periods. In diﬀerent sessions, we reversed the order of the
parameterizations to allow for sequencing eﬀects. Table 3.1 gives an overview of
the sessions.
Symmetric/Asymmetric Period 1-10 Period 11-20
S1/A1 b = 0.1 b = 0.67
S2/A2 b = 0.67 b = 0.1
S3/A3 b = 0.67 b = 1
S4/A4 b = 1 b = 0.67
Table 3.1: Four symmetric and four asymmetric sessions.
In seven of eight sessions, there were 36 subjects.9 This led to a total of 5640
investment observations. Moreover, in each period, subjects were asked to give
a belief about the investment of the other group member.
In the asymmetric sessions, the roles of leader and laggard were randomly
9In S3, there were 30 participants.
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assigned and there was no switch over the 20 periods. No subject participated
in more than one session. We built fixed matching groups of 6 people for statis-
tical reasons. The participants were randomly matched into groups of size two
within the matching groups. At the end of each period, subjects were informed
about the investment level of the other group member and their own net profit
for that period. In each session, participants received an initial endowment of
CHF 20 (≈EUR 12). Average earnings including the endowment were CHF 38
(≈EUR 24) for S1 and S2, and CHF 30 (≈EUR 19) for S3 and S4. In A1 and
A2, average earnings were CHF 40 (≈EUR 25) and CHF 32 (≈EUR 20) for lead-
ers and laggards, respectively. In A3 and A4, leaders earned on average CHF
35 (≈EUR 22); laggards CHF 24 (≈EUR 15). Sessions lasted about 2 hours
each. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
3.3.2 Results
In this section, we discuss the experimental results. To analyze the eﬀects of
varying the intensity of competition on the investment behavior, we consider
three diﬀerent parameterizations (b = 1/10, b = 2/3, b = 1) . First, we treat the
asymmetric setting; second, the symmetric case.
The Asymmetric Setting
In the following, we analyze the first ten and the last ten periods of the four
asymmetric sessions in turn. After that, to focus on sequencing eﬀects, we com-
pare A1 to A2, and A3 to A4; that is, we consider pairs of sessions which include
the same values of b, but diﬀer with respect to the order of the parameterizations.
Investments in the two period ranges The theoretical prediction is that
leaders invest more than laggards. Further, for leaders, there is a U-shaped
relation between intensity of competition and investment; for laggards, there
is a negative relation. The experiment provides evidence for these predictions
both for the first ten and for the last ten periods. However, the strength of the
U-shaped relation is diﬀerent for the two period ranges. We start with the first
period range.
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Result 12 In the first ten periods, leaders invest more than laggards. Lead-
ers’ investments are lowest for intermediate competition. Laggards’ investments
strictly decrease with increasing intensity of competition.
Period 1-10
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10
11
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b=0.1 b=0.67 b=1
Mean Inv. Leader Mean Inv. Laggard Equilibrium Leader Equilibrium Laggard
Figure 3.3: Leaders’ and laggards’ investment in period 1-10.
Figure 3.3 reveals that increasing dominance arises. For all values of b, a
regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test show high significance
(p < 0.01) when considering the diﬀerence between leaders’ and laggards’ invest-
ments. Further, for leaders, there is underinvestment when competition is strong
(b = 1) ; for laggards, there is overinvestment when competition is intermediate
and strong (b = 0.67, b = 1) . A regression over a constant shows that, for leaders,
there is no significant diﬀerence between investments and Nash equilibrium for
b = 0.1 and b = 0.67. However, this result is not fully supported by a Wilcoxon
rank sum test which yields significance at the 10%-level. On the other hand, the
diﬀerence between actual and equilibrium investments is highly significant when
competition is strong. For laggards, there is no significant deviation from the
equilibrium for b = 0.1; high significance is given for b = 0.67 and b = 1. These
deviations from the equilibrium can be explained through players’ beliefs.10
Leaders believe that laggards invest more than they actually do. This is
shown in Figure 3.4. Interestingly, given the wrong beliefs, leaders essentially
choose the optimal investment level. In fact, the best response to the own beliefs
10Observe that own investments and beliefs about other players’ investments are strategic
substitutes.
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Figure 3.4: Leaders’ and laggards’ belief in period 1-10.
almost coincides with actual investments; a regression over a constant and a
Wilcoxon rank sum test yield no significant diﬀerence. Rather, laggards believe
that leaders invest less than they actually do. This explains the overinvestment
of the laggards. However, their investments are even higher than the best re-
sponse to the wrong beliefs. The asymmetry between leaders and laggards — the
former best-respond to their beliefs while the laggards do not — is astonishing.
One explanation may be that laggards deliberately hurt leaders who have an
exogenous advantage.
We consider now the last ten periods. The investment behavior is similar to
that discussed above.
Result 13 In the last ten periods, leaders invest more than laggards. Lead-
ers’ investments are lowest for intermediate competition. Laggards’ investments
strictly decrease with increasing intensity of competition.
Figure 3.5 shows that, like in the first ten periods, increasing dominance
emerges. The diﬀerence between leaders’ and laggards’ investments is highly
significant for each parameterization.11 Moreover, for leaders, there is slight
overinvestment when competition is weak and intermediate, and striking under-
investment for strong competition. For laggards, there is overinvestment for all
values of b. Regarding the deviation from the equilibrium, a regression over a
11This is supported both by a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
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Period 11-20
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Figure 3.5: Leaders’ and laggards’ investment in period 11-20.
constant and aWilcoxon rank sum test yield high significance for each parameter
value and player’s role. Again, subjects’ beliefs are helpful to understand the
investment behavior.
Period 11-20
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Figure 3.6: Leaders’ and laggards’ belief in period 11-20.
Figure 3.6 reveals that, for leaders, the underinvestment for b = 1 is related
to wrong beliefs about laggards’ investments. However, in contrast to the first
ten periods, wrong beliefs do not fully explain the underinvestment behavior. In
fact, investments of leaders are even lower than the best response to the own
overestimated beliefs. Further, for laggards, the overinvestment results from
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underestimating leaders’ investments. Like in the first ten periods, laggards
invest even more than the best response to the wrong beliefs.
Results 12 and 13 have shown that, for leaders, a U-shaped relation emerges;
for laggards, there is a negative relation. To test how strong these relations are,
we consider the following random-eﬀects model:
Y it,k = β0 + β1δ
i
weak,k + β2δ
i
strong,k + e
i
t,k + μ
i
k, (3.16)
where eit,k is a residual term which is independent across groups k; μ
i
k, which
captures the random eﬀects, is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable in
all time periods. The dummy variable δiweak,k takes the value 1 if the investment
of subject i belonging to group k occurs in the first ten periods of A1 or in the
last ten periods of A2, where the intensity of competition is weak. Otherwise, it
takes the value 0. Similarly, δistrong,k takes the value 1 if b = 1.
Estimates are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Eﬀects of the intensity of competition on the investment behavior.
Period 1-10 Period 11-20 Period 1-10 Period 11-20
Variable Leader Leader Laggard Laggard
const
8.5944∗∗∗
(0.2593)
8.8972∗∗∗
(0.2694)
7.0333∗∗∗
(0.2790)
6.4416∗∗∗
(0.2539)
weak
0.6611∗∗
(0.4041)
0.4361∗
(0.4659)
0.7944∗∗
(0.3969)
2.1416∗∗∗
(0.4657)
strong
1.7666∗∗∗
(0.4367)
0.5027∗
(0.4898)
−1.2722∗∗∗
(0.5254)
−0.8194∗∗
(0.4927)
Note: Random-eﬀects GLS regression. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-
level, *** at the 1%-level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The reference variable is intermediate competition. First, consider leaders.
For period 1 to 10, the coeﬃcients related to weak and strong are positive and
significant at the 5% and 1%-level, respectively. Investments for b = 0.1 are
0.6611 units higher than for b = 0.67; those for b = 1 are 1.7666 units higher
than for b = 0.67. This implies that the U-shaped relation is quite strong even
though there is underinvestment for b = 1. Rather, in period 11 to 20, we
denote a clearly weaker relationship. The coeﬃcients for weak and strong are
positive and significant at the 10%-level. Thus, for b = 1, underinvestment
is more pronounced in the last ten periods. Second, consider laggards. The
negative relation is substantial in each period range. The coeﬃcients for weak
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are positive and significant at the 5% and 1%-level, respectively; those for strong
are negative and significant at the 1% and 5%-level, respectively.
We can now summarize the findings related to Table 3.2 in the following
result.
Result 14 For leaders, the U-shaped relation is stronger in the first ten than in
the last ten periods. For laggards, the negative relation is strong no matter what
period range is considered.
Sequencing eﬀects So far we have discussed the investment behavior in the
two period ranges. In the following, we analyze whether sessions involving the
same values of b but a diﬀerent order of the parameterizations lead to similar
results. To this end, we compare the investment distributions in A1 to those in
A2. Analogously, for A3 and A4. Dealing with the investment distributions also
allows us to highlight the heterogeneity of player behavior. We start with A1
and A2, where b = 0.1 and b = 0.67 are the relevant parameters.
Result 15 For A1 and A2, more intense competition shifts the leaders’ and
laggards’ investment distribution to the left.
According to prediction, leaders and laggards choose in both sessions higher
investments when competition is less intense. This holds no matter what compe-
tition parameter is implemented first. For leaders, the investment distributions
in A1 are shown in Figure 3.7.
Switching from weak to intermediate competition shifts the global maximum
from 9 (34%) to 8 (56%). For laggards, the investment distributions in A1 are
shown in Figure 3.8. More intense competition shifts the global maximum from
8 (47%) to 6 (54%).
The analysis of A2, where the parameterization order is reversed, leads to
very similar results. We therefore omit additional considerations related to A2.
In the following, we investigate sessions A3 and A4, where the parameters
involved are b = 0.67 and b = 1.
Result 16 For A3 and A4, more intense competition shifts the laggards’ invest-
ment distribution to the left; the shift of the leaders’ distribution to the right is
more pronounced in A4 than in A3.
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Figure 3.7: Leaders’ investment distributions in A1.
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Figure 3.8: Laggards’ investment distributions in A1.
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As predicted, in both sessions, laggards choose lower investments when com-
petition is more intense. For leaders, there is a diﬀerence between A3 and A4.
Consistent with Result 14, the distribution in A3 does not clearly shift to the
right with increasing competition. The parameter switch in A4 has a greater
impact on investments of leaders. Figure 3.9 shows the leaders’ investment dis-
tributions in A4.
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Figure 3.9: Leaders’ investment distributions in A4.
The switch from strong to intermediate competition shifts the global maxi-
mum from 11 (23%) to 8 (33%). Figure 3.10 shows the investment distributions
of laggards in A4. Less intense competition shifts the global maximum from 4
(19%) to 6 (27%).
The Symmetric Setting
In the following, we consider the symmetric case. Like in the asymmetric setting,
we first analyze the investment behavior in the two period ranges, then the
sequencing eﬀects.
Investments in the two period ranges The theoretical prediction is that,
for both players, there is a U-shaped relation between intensity of competition
and investment. The experiment provides evidence for this prediction both for
the first ten and last ten periods. Again, like in the asymmetric setting, the
strength of the U-shaped relation is diﬀerent for the two period ranges.
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Figure 3.10: Laggards’ investment distributions in A4.
Result 17 In the first ten periods, investments are lowest for intermediate com-
petition.
Period 1-10
7.6
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b=0.1 b=0.67 b=1
Mean Investment Equilibrium
Figure 3.11: Mean investment in period 1-10.
Figure 3.11 reveals that there is overinvestment for all values of b. Both a
regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test show that the diﬀer-
ence between observed and equilibrium investments is highly significant. The
overinvestment behavior reflects underestimated beliefs.
Figure 3.12 shows that subjects believe that their group members invest less
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Figure 3.12: Mean belief in period 1-10.
than they actually do. However, for b = 0.1 and b = 0.67, mean investments are
even higher than the best response to the wrong beliefs. For b = 1, mean invest-
ments exactly coincide with the best response to the underestimated beliefs.
Next, we consider the last ten periods, for which the investment behavior is
similar to the other period range.
Result 18 In the last ten periods, investments are lowest for intermediate com-
petition.
Period 11-20
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Mean Investment Equilibrium
Figure 3.13: Mean investment in period 11-20.
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For weak and intermediate competition, Figure 3.13 indicates overinvestment;
for strong competition, there is slight underinvestment. For b = 0.1 and b = 0.67,
both a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test show that the
diﬀerence between observed and equilibrium investments is highly significant.
For b = 1, there is no significant diﬀerence.
Period 11-20
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Figure 3.14: Mean belief in period 11-20.
For weak and intermediate competition, Figure 3.14 reveals that the overin-
vestment can be partly explained through the underestimated beliefs. However,
mean investments are even higher than the best response to the wrong beliefs.
For strong competition, the underestimated beliefs do not lead to overinvestment
which would arise by best-responding.
To test the strength of the U-shaped relations shown in Result 17 and 18,
consider the random-eﬀects model given by (3.16). Estimates are shown in Table
3.3. For period 1 to 10, the coeﬃcient related to weak is positive and significant
at the 1%-level. The coeﬃcient for strong is positive and significant at the 10%-
level. This means that the decrease in investment is substantial when switching
from weak to intermediate competition; the increase when switching from in-
termediate to strong competition is less pronounced. For period 11 to 20, the
coeﬃcient for weak is positive and significant at the 1%-level; the one for strong
is positive but not significant. This implies that the decrease in investment is
strong, the increase extremely weak.
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Table 3.3: Eﬀects of the intensity of competition on the investment behavior.
Variable Period 1-10 Period 11-20
const
8.3590∗∗∗
(0.1684)
8.0916∗∗∗
(0.1644)
weak
1.1075∗∗∗
(0.2384)
1.4666∗∗∗
(0.2239)
strong
0.3436∗
(0.2715)
0.1050
(0.3502)
Note: Random-eﬀects GLS regression. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, *** at the
1%-level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Summarizing we get Result 19.
Result 19 The U-shaped relation is stronger in the first ten than in the last ten
periods.
Sequencing eﬀects In the following, we compare S1 to S2, and S3 to S4. We
start with S1 and S2, where b = 0.1 and b = 0.67 are the relevant parameters.
Result 20 For S1 and S2, more intense competition shifts the players’ invest-
ment distribution to the left.
According to prediction, subjects choose in both sessions higher investments
when competition is less intense. For the considered two sessions, the distribu-
tions look similar. Figure 3.15 concerns S1.
For weak competition, the global maximum is at 9 and chosen in 51% of the
cases. In fact, playing 9 represents a weakly dominant strategy.12 Switching
to intermediate competition shifts the global maximum to 8 (32%). The last
considerations refer to S3 and S4, where b = 0.67 and b = 1 are the parameters
involved.
Result 21 For S3 and S4, more intense competition does not unambiguously
shift the players’ investment distribution to the right.
12In S1, we have eleven subjects choosing the investment level of 9 in each of the ten periods,
sixteen subjects in at least eight periods. There are 28 subjects which invest on average between
8 and 10.
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Figure 3.15: Investment distributions in S1.
In contrast to prediction, higher intensity of competition does not clearly
lead to higher investments. This is consistent with Result 19. Figure 3.16,
which refers to S3, shows that the distributions are similar.
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Figure 3.16: Investment distributions in S3.
3.4 Conclusion
We have analyzed the eﬀects of varying the intensity of competition on invest-
ment incentives in an experiment, where we implemented a reduced form version
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of a two-stage game. In the first stage, duopolists choose cost-reducing invest-
ments. In the second stage, they choose quantities in a heterogenous good mar-
ket. Increasing competition corresponds to decreasing product diﬀerentiation.
We considered two settings: A symmetric and an asymmetric one. In the
symmetric setting, firms’ initial marginal costs are identical. In the asymmetric
setting, there is a leader-laggard structure. The leader has lower marginal costs
ex-ante. We have shown that, for symmetric firms and leaders, there is a U-
shaped relation between the intensity of competition and investment. If the
ex-ante cost diﬀerence between leader and laggard is suﬃciently high, there is
a negative relation for the laggard. Otherwise, the laggard also exhibits a U-
shaped relation. Moreover, the leader invests more than the laggard; that is,
increasing dominance arises.
The experimental sessions mostly support the theoretical predictions. For
symmetric players and leaders, the U-shaped relation emerges; for laggards, as
predicted, there is a negative relation. Moreover, leaders invest more than lag-
gards, providing evidence for increasing dominance. However, in both settings,
there are deviations from the equilibrium. To a large extent, these deviations
reflect best responses to wrong beliefs. In the symmetric setting, there is over-
investment no matter which intensity of competition is implemented. In the
asymmetric setting, leaders underinvest under strong competition and laggards
mostly overinvest.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 11
(3.5) leads to the following results.
If 2
3
< b ≤ 1 and 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < a, then ∂
2Π1
∂c1∂b
< 0. Further, (3.5) has a unique
zero bˆ ∈ (0, 2
3
]. bˆ is given by
bˆ =
4− 2
p
−3Q2 + 4
3Q
, (3.17)
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where Q = Y2Y1 ≤ 1. Thus, Q
2 < 4
3
ensures the existence of bˆ. If Y2Y1 → 1, then
bˆ→ 2
3
.
If 0 ≤ b < 2
3
and 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < a, then ∂
2Π2
∂c2∂b
> 0. Further, ∂
2Π2
∂c2∂b
has a unique
zero b˜ ∈
£
2
3
, 1
¤
. b˜ is given by (3.17), where Q = Y1Y2 . We need Q
2 ≤ 4
3
to ensure
the existence of b˜, and Q2 ≤ 64
49
to ensure that b˜ ∈ [0, 1] . If 64
49
< Q2 ≤ 4
3
, then
b˜ ∈ (1, 2√
3
]. If Q2 > 4
3
, there is no b˜.
This yields statements (i) to (iv).
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Chapter 4
Simplifying Experimental
Design: One Stage vs. Two
Stages
Dario Sacco
4.1 Introduction
Many experiments dealing with two-stage models are implemented as reduced
form versions of the original setting. Often, to focus on first-stage decisions,
avoiding the chance of an influence of the second stage on the first one, the
second stage is not modeled explicitly. Usually, this simplification is applied in
experiments dealing with investment decisions in oligopolistic environments.1
In this paper, we implement a two-stage game as a two-stage experiment.
We compare the results obtained in this fashion to those arising in an one-stage
experiment, which reproduces a reduced form of the same game. To this end, we
deal with the two-stage model and the corresponding one-stage experiment dis-
cussed in Sacco (2008). The analysis concerns the relation between the intensity
1See Suetens (2005), Halbheer et al. (2007), Sacco (2008) for experiments where the second
stage, corresponding to Cournot competition, is not modeled explicitly.
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of competition and process investments. We consider a game where duopolists
with identical initial marginal costs choose cost-reducing investments in the first
stage.2 In the second stage, they engage in diﬀerentiated Cournot competition.
An increase in competition corresponds to a reduction in product diﬀerentiation.
It turns out that the relation between the intensity of competition and invest-
ments is U-shaped. As long as product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently strong, an
increase in competition reduces investments. For suﬃciently similar products, a
further increase in competition yields higher investments.
In the two-stage experiment, where subjects take investment and output deci-
sions, we analyze player behavior for two levels of competition (intermediate and
strong).3 As a result, underinvestment arises for both intensities of competition.
Moreover, in contrast to the prediction, the switch from intermediate to strong
competition does not increase investments. Interestingly, this paper does not
support the results obtained through the one-stage experiment, where subjects
only take investment decisions and earn the equilibrium profits corresponding
to the resulting product market subgame. There, overinvestment arises for both
intermediate and strong competition. Further, as predicted, higher intensity of
competition leads to greater investments.
Indeed, the product market stage influences the investment stage. It is impor-
tant to understand how. Underinvestment in stage one should be induced by an
output level in stage two, which lies below the Nash equilibrium; because, for a
lower output, cost-reduction is less valuable. In fact, for strong competition, sub-
jects choose outputs below the Cournot equilibrium outcome (CEO).4 However,
the observed outputs are not suﬃcient to explain underinvestment. Played in-
vestments are even lower than the optimal investments resulting from the chosen
outputs. For intermediate competition, underinvestment cannot be explained by
outputs below the CEO. Rather, outputs lie above the Nash equilibrium reflect-
ing best-response behavior to wrong beliefs. That is, subjects believe that the
2In addition, Sacco (2008) deals with the asymmetric case, where one firm is ex-ante ahead
of the competitor.
3At the chosen level of intermediate competition, the U-shaped investment function shows
its minimum. Strong competition corresponds to homogenous Cournot competition. In addi-
tion, Sacco (2008) considers a weak level of competition.
4Outputs below the CEO in a homogenous Cournot duopoly also arise in Huck et al.
(2004). However, they deal with a one-stage Cournot experiment and are not concerned with
investment decisions.
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other players choose outputs below equilibrium and respond accordingly.5
Interestingly, higher intensity of competition does not aﬀect investments but
outputs which, in contrast to the prediction, are greater for intermediate than
for strong competition.6 Subjects choose higher output levels in the setting
where the negative externalities of other players’ choices on the own decisions
are weaker.
There are few studies dealing with models implemented as two-stage ex-
periments and we are not aware of papers which explicitly compare two-stage
to one-stage experiments that refer to the same model. Isaac and Reynolds
(1992) analyze a stochastic dynamic model, where firms invest in process R&D
and compete in a product market. The cost-reduction is random and depends
on the firm’s amount of R&D. They show that a Schumpeterian competition
emerges, which is characterized by costly innovation, falling prices, and rising
concentration. Further, Jullien and Ruﬃeux (2001) deal with cost-reductions
in competitive double auction markets, where firms can either invest in cost-
reduction in a known way or develop a new technology with uncertain outcome.
They show that prices converge towards the competition level. Finally, Suetens
(2008) considers a R&D stage and a pricing stage to test whether R&D cooper-
ation enhances price collusion. She deals with two treatments (no vs. complete
spillovers) and finds out that, in general, prices are between the Nash equilibrium
and the cooperative level.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 contains the theoretical frame-
work. Section 4.3 describes the experimental design and results. Section 4.4
concludes.
4.2 The Model
Consider a two-stage game, where firms i = 1, 2 first engage in cost-reducing
investments and then compete in the product market.7 The inverse demand
functions are given by
pi = a− qi − bqj, i 6= j, (4.1)
where b ∈ [0, 1] , and a > 0.
5Observe that in the Cournot game outputs are strategic substitutes.
6In contrast to Huck et al. (2004), where outputs increase in competition in the sense of a
larger number of firms, we have outputs decreasing in the intensity of competition.
7The set-up corresponds to Sacco (2008).
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For b = 0, equation (4.1) implies that both firms are monopolists. The case
b = 1 corresponds to a homogenous Cournot market. Thus, the higher b the
higher the intensity of competition.
Firms are ex-ante symmetric; that is, initial marginal costs are given by
c0i = c0. In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose investments yi ∈ [0, c0),
resulting in marginal costs ci = c0 − yi. The investment costs are quadratic and
given by ky2i , where k > 0. In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose
quantities, that is, they compete à la Cournot.
Backward induction shows that the net profit of firm i = 1, 2 in the first stage
of the game is given by
πi =
µ
2(Y 0 + yi)− b(Y 0 + yj)
4− b2
¶2
− ky2i , i 6= j, (4.2)
where Y 0 ≡ a− c0 > 0 represents the eﬃciency level.8
The maximization of (4.2) with respect to yi leads to
∂πi
∂yi
=
8 (Y 0 + yi)− 4b (Y 0 + yj)
(4− b2)2
− 2kyi ≡ 0. (4.3)
From the first-order condition (4.3), the following optimal relation between
investments and outputs arises:
yi =
2qi
k(4− b2) . (4.4)
The second-order condition is given by
∂2πi
∂y2i
=
8
(4− b2)2
− 2k < 0. (4.5)
Note that (4.5) is fulfilled ∀b ∈ [0, 1] if k > 4
9
.
From (4.3), it follows that
yi =
4Y 0 − 2b (Y 0 + yj)
k (4− b2)2 − 4
. (4.6)
Relation (4.6) implies the following equilibrium investments:
y∗i = y
∗ =
2Y 0
k (2 + b) (4− b2)− 2 . (4.7)
8Note that in the Cournot game the root of the gross profit, namely the term
2(Y 0+yi)−b(Y 0+yj)
4−b2 ≡ qi, represents the optimal output level. Here and in the following, we
assume that 2(Y 0 + yi)− b(Y 0 + yj) > 0.
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Next, we consider the specific parameterization used in the reduced-form
experiment of Sacco (2008) that we will also implement in this experiment. Let
a = 50, k = 1, and c0 = 21. Figure 4.1 shows the plot of the equilibrium
investments for b ∈ [0, 1] .
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Figure 4.1: Investments of the firms.
In the experiment, we consider two cases for b, which correspond to diﬀerent
intensities of competition: b = 2
3
(intermediate) and b = 1 (strong). For the two
values of the competition parameter b, the following equilibrium investments
arise: (
b = 2
3
⇒ y∗ = 7.75
b = 1⇒ y∗ = 8.28
. (4.8)
Figure 4.1 reveals that, for both firms, there is a U-shaped relation between
intensity of competition and investments. In particular, the switch from inter-
mediate to strong competition leads to higher investments. The minimum of the
investment function lies at b = 2
3
.
Further, the equilibrium outputs q∗i = q∗ are given as follows:(
b = 2
3
⇒ q∗ = 11.77
b = 1⇒ q∗ = 12.43
. (4.9)
As shown in (4.8) and (4.9), there is a positive relation between equilibrium
investments and outputs; a cost reduction is more valuable for higher output
levels.
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4.3 The Experiment
4.3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
The game implemented in the experiment exactly reproduces the described two-
stage game. Subjects took investment and output decisions, which we restricted
to yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 14} and qi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 19}, respectively.
In April 2008, we conducted two experimental sessions at the University
of Zurich. Participants were undergraduate students.9 Each session had 20
periods. There was a switch of the competition parameter after period 10. That
is, participants played the game for one parameterization in the first ten periods
and for the other parameterization in the last ten periods. In the two sessions,
we reversed the order of the parameterizations to allow for sequencing eﬀects.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the sessions.
Session Period 1-10 Period 11-20
S1 b = 0.67 b = 1
S2 b = 1 b = 0.67
Table 4.1: Two sessions.
In S1, there were 36 subjects; in S2, 30. This led to a total of 1320 investment
and equivalent output observations. Moreover, in each period, subjects were
asked to give a belief about investment and output of the other group member.
No subject participated in more than one session. We built fixed matching
groups of 6 subjects for statistical reasons. The participants were randomly
matched into groups of size two within the matching groups. At the end of
each period, subjects were informed about investment and output level of the
other group member and their own net profit for that period. In each session,
participants received an initial endowment of CHF 20 (≈EUR 12). Average
earnings including the endowment were CHF 30 (≈EUR 19) for both S1 and
S2. Sessions lasted about 2 hours each. The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
9We did not exclude any disciplines. We had students of law, engineering, psychology,
economics etc.
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4.3.2 Results
In this section, we discuss the experimental results. First, we analyze the invest-
ment stage; then, the output stage. For both stages, it turns out that the results
concerning the first ten periods are very similar to those arising in the last ten
periods. To avoid replication, we will focus on the first period range.10
The Investment Stage
In the following, we discuss the strong competition and the intermediate com-
petition case in turn.
Strong competition First, we compare observed investments in the one-stage
with those in the two-stage experiment.
Result 22 Under strong competition, mean investments are higher for one stage
than for two stages.
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Figure 4.2: One stage vs. two stages: Mean investments for b = 1.
Figure 4.2 reveals that investments are clearly higher in the one-stage than
in the two-stage case; a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum
test show high significance (p < 0.01). Further, there is overinvestment for one
10The choice of the period range has to do with the fact that in Sacco (2008) the analyzed
eﬀects are stronger in the first ten than in the last ten periods.
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stage and underinvestment for two stages. As shown in Sacco (2008) for the
one-stage case, overinvestment reflects wrong beliefs that subjects have about
the investments of the other players. Subjects believe that the others invest less
than they actually do and thus overinvest.11 To a large extent, subjects play
best response to the own wrong beliefs. In the two-stage case, underinvestment
is not driven by overestimated beliefs about investments. In fact, there is no
significant diﬀerence between investments and corresponding beliefs (see Figure
4.3). Rather, the underinvestment in stage one appears to result because subjects
correctly anticipate that their second-stage output will be lower than the CEO,
and, accordingly, they invest less than in the subgame perfect equilibrium. To
make this idea precise, we introduce some useful terminology.
Definition 3 y∗i (qi) is player’s i optimal investment level in stage one if player
i chooses the output level qi in stage two. Relation (4.4) for k = 1 implies
y∗i (qi) =
2qi
4− b2 . (4.10)
Further, we define
y¯∗(q¯) =
2q¯
4− b2 (4.11)
as the optimal mean investment level in stage one if q¯ is the played mean output
level in stage two.
Definition 3 shows, for given second-stage outputs, the optimal investment
levels in the first stage.12 We abstract from the fact that subjects’ investment
choices may influence the output choices of the other players.
Using Definition 3, we characterize the relation between the observed mean
investment level denoted as y¯ and the played mean output level q¯.
Result 23 Under strong competition, q¯ < q∗ in stage two leads to y¯ < y¯∗(q¯) <
y∗(q∗) in stage one.
Subjects choose investments according to the expectations that they have
about their own outputs. However, outputs below the CEO are not suﬃcient to
explain underinvestment. In fact, y¯ is even lower than y¯∗(q¯). This is shown in
Figure 4.3. Over the period range, the dotted line represents (4.11) for b = 1.
11Note that investments and corresponding beliefs are strategic substitutes.
12Note that relation (4.11) holds because the mean investment level only depends on players’
total output.
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Figure 4.3: Investments and beliefs for b = 1.
Intermediate competition For intermediate competition, the two-stage ex-
periment also leads to lower investments than in the one-stage case.
Result 24 Under intermediate competition, mean investments are higher for
one stage than for two stages.
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period
b=0.67 (1-stage) Equilibrium b=0.67 (2-stages)
Figure 4.4: One stage vs. two stages: Mean investments for b = 0.67.
Figure 4.4 reveals that, like for strong competition, the diﬀerence between
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one-stage and two-stage investments is substantial.13 Again, beliefs about other
players’ investments do not aﬀect own investments (see Figure 4.5). However, in
contrast to strong competition, underinvestment in stage one is not implied by
outputs below the CEO in stage two.
Result 25 Under intermediate competition, y¯ < y∗(q∗) in stage one does not
result from q¯ < q∗ in stage two.
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Figure 4.5: Investments and beliefs for b = 0.67.
In fact, played outputs lie above the CEO, which should lead to overinvest-
ment. The dotted line in Figure 4.5 represents the optimal investments implied
by (4.11) for b = 0.67.14
Another interesting aspect concerns the investment increase predicted by the
model when switching from intermediate to strong competition. In the one-
stage experiment, this increase in competition indeed has a positive eﬀect on
investments. However, the two-stage experiment does not yield the same result.
Result 26 In the two-stage case, higher intensity of competition does not in-
crease investments.
13A regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test show that the investment
diﬀerence is highly significant.
14The deviation of observed investments from the optimal investments obtained by back-
ward induction from the played outputs is more pronounced under intermediate than strong
competition.
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Figure 4.6: Investments for b = 0.67 and b = 1.
Figure 4.6 shows that, for the two intensities of competition, investments are
close; over the period range, the diﬀerence is not significant.15
The Output Stage
In the following, we provide an explanation for the fact that, in spite of the output
diﬀerence between intermediate and strong competition − in the former case
outputs lie above the CEO, in the latter case below the CEO − underinvestment
arises for both intensities of competition. As in the previous section, we start
with the strong competition case.
Strong competition To illustrate the output behavior, consider first the fol-
lowing definition.
Definition 4 q∗i (yi, yj) is player’s i optimal output level in stage two if players
i and j choose the investment levels yi and yj in stage one, respectively. From
Section 4.2, we have
q∗i (yi, yj) =
2(Y 0 + yi)− b(Y 0 + yj)
4− b2 . (4.12)
Further, analogously to (4.11), we define
q¯∗(y¯) =
(2− b)(Y 0 + y¯)
4− b2 (4.13)
15Over all considered periods and subjects, the mean investment is 6.52 for b = 0.67 and
6.53 for b = 1.
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as the optimal mean output level in stage two if y¯ is the played mean investment
level in stage one.
Next, we characterize the played outputs.
Result 27 Under strong competition, mean outputs converge towards q¯∗(y¯).
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Figure 4.7: Outputs and beliefs for b = 1.
Figure 4.7 reveals that played outputs are not aﬀected by the beliefs about
other players’ outputs.16 Further, we see that observed outputs converge towards
the optimal level that follows from the chosen investments. In the last five periods
of the considered range, there is no significant diﬀerence.
The fact that the relation between the two stages drives subject behavior
is reinforced by the following considerations. First, for individual decisions,
there is a significantly positive relation between own investments and outputs
(p < 0.01). However, the regression line referring to the actual relation is flatter
than the optimal relation line.17 This is shown in Figure 4.8. Second, there
is a significantly negative relation between other players’ investments and own
outputs (p = 0.045). However, the optimal relation line is steeper.18 This is
shown in Figure 4.9.
16The diﬀerence between outputs and corresponding beliefs is not significant.
17By (4.10), the slope of the optimal relation line is given by 23 .
18It is easy to check from the equilibrium output that the slope is −13 . The intercept is
arbitrary chosen as 10.
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Figure 4.8: Relation between own investments and outputs.
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Figure 4.9: Relation between other players’ investments and own output.
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Intermediate competition Interestingly, for intermediate competition, un-
derinvestment is not driven by outputs below the CEO. Rather, outputs lie above
equilibrium. In the following, we provide an explanation for the output behavior
in stage two. To this end, consider the following definition.
Definition 5 q∗i (yi, Bi(qj)) is player’s i best response to the own belief about
player’s j output in stage two, given that yi is player’s i investment level in stage
one. In other words,
q∗i (yi, Bi(qj)) = argmaxqi
(a− qi − bBi(qj)− ci)qi. (4.14)
Further, we define q∗(y¯, B¯) as players’ best response to the own mean beliefs
about other subjects’ output in stage two, given that y¯ is the mean investment
level in stage one.
Now, we characterize the output behavior.
Result 28 Under intermediate competition, mean outputs converge towards
q∗(y¯, B¯).
In contrast to strong competition, beliefs about other players’ outputs have
an impact on own output choices (see Figure 4.10). This explains the output
behavior in stage two. However, the inconsistency between played investments
and outputs obviously still holds.
Unlike investment decisions, the switch from intermediate to strong compe-
tition aﬀects output choices. Subjects play higher output levels in the setting
where the negative externalities resulting from the other players are weaker.
Result 29 In the two-stage case, higher intensity of competition decreases mean
outputs.
Figure 4.11 reveals that, in each period of the considered range, in contrast to
the prediction, outputs are higher for intermediate than for strong competition;
the diﬀerence is highly significant.
Individual decisions confirm the explanation provided above. Figure 4.12
shows the relation between own investments and outputs. In line with the strong
4. Simplifying Experimental Design: One Stage vs. Two Stages 95
9.5
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
12.5
13
13.5
14
14.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period
Mean Bel. (b=0.67) Equilibrium Mean Out. (b=0.67) Best Resp.
Figure 4.10: Outputs and beliefs for b = 0.67.
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Figure 4.11: Outputs for b = 0.67 and b = 1.
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Figure 4.12: Relation between own investments and outputs.
competition case, there is a significantly positive relation between own invest-
ments and outputs (p < 0.01). Again, the actual relation regression line is flatter
than the optimal relation line.19
For intermediate competition, consistently with Result 28, one may expect
that other players’ investments have a diﬀerent impact on own output choices
than for strong competition. In fact, the negative relation between investments of
the other players and own outputs obtained in the strong competition case does
not emerge for intermediate competition. Rather, the relation is significantly
positive (p = 0.093). This is revealed in Figure 4.13.20
Summing up, for intermediate competition, subjects tend to neglect the in-
vestments of the other players and focus more on stage two. For strong compe-
tition, investment choices are consistent with output decisions.
4.4 Conclusion
We compared the results obtained through a two-stage experiment to those aris-
ing from an one-stage experiment implementing the same two-stage model. We
considered a duopoly game which deals with the relation between the intensity
of competition and process investments. In the first stage, ex-ante symmetric
duopolists choose cost-reducing investments; in the second stage, they engage in
19The slope of the optimal relation line is 916 .
20The optimal relation line shows a slope of − 316 . The intercept is arbitrary chosen as 9.
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Figure 4.13: Relation between other players’ investments and own output.
diﬀerentiated Cournot competition. An increase in competition corresponds to
a reduction in product diﬀerentiation.
In the one-stage experiment, where subjects only take investment decisions,
there is overinvestment for both intermediate and strong competition. Further,
as predicted, an increase in competition yields higher investments.
Interestingly, the two-stage experiment, where subjects take investment and
output decisions, does not support the one-stage results. For both intermedi-
ate and strong competition, there is underinvestment; further, an increase in
competition does not lead to higher investments.
Underinvestment in stage one should be induced by outputs below the CEO
in stage two. Indeed, this arises for strong competition. Rather, for intermediate
competition, outputs lie above equilibrium reflecting best-response behavior to
wrong beliefs about other players’ outputs. Subjects choose higher output levels
in the setting where decisions of other players have a weaker impact on own
choices.
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